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Abstract
We present some hypersequent calculi for all systems of the classical
cube and their extensions with axioms T , P , D, and, for every n ≥ 1, rule
RD+n . The calculi are internal as they only employ the language of the
logic, plus additional structural connectives. We show that the calculi are
complete with respect to the corresponding axiomatisation by a syntactic
proof of cut elimination. Then we define a terminating root-first proof
search strategy based on the hypersequent calculi and show that it is
optimal for coNP-complete logics. Moreover, we obtain that from every
saturated leaf of a failed proof it is possible to define a countermodel of
the root hypersequent in the bi-neighbourhood semantics, and for regular
logics also in the relational semantics. We finish the paper by giving a
translation between hypersequent rule applications and derivations in a
labelled system for the classical cube.
Keywords Non-normal modal logic, deontic logic, hypersequent calcu-
lus, neighbourhood semantics, optimal complexity.
1 Introduction
Non-normal modal logics–NNMLs for short–have a long history, going back to
the seminal works by Kripke, Montague, Segeberg, Scott, and Chellas (see [4]
for an introduction). They are “non-normal” as they do not contain all axioms
∗This work has been partially supported by the ANR project TICAMORE ANR-16- CE91-
0002-01. Lellmann has been supported by WWTF project MA16-28. Pimentel has been
partially supported by CNPq.
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of minimal normal modal logicK. NNMLs find an interest in several areas, from
epistemic to deontic reasoning. They also play a roˆle in multi-agent reasoning
and strategic reasoning in games. For instance in epistemic reasoning they offer
a simple (although partial) solution to the problem of logical omniscience (see
[35]); in deontic logic, they allow avoiding well-known paradoxes (such as Ross’s
Paradox) and to represent conflicting obligations (see [15]); multi-agent logics
with non-normal modalities have been proposed to capture agency and ability:
✷A is read as the agent can bring about A (see [9]); a related interpretation is
the game-theoretical interpretation of ✷A as “the agent has a winning strategy
to bring about A” (indeed, non-normal monotonic logic M can be seen as a 2-
agent case of coalition logic with determinacy [30]). Finally, NNMLs are needed
also when ✷A is interpreted as “A is true in most of the cases” [1].
In this work, we consider the classical cube of NMMLs, given by the ex-
tensions of minimal modal logic E, containing only the congruence rule RE,
with axioms C, M and N . We also consider extensions with axioms/rules T,
D, P, and D+n , where T is the reflexivity axiom in classical normal modal logic,
and the others axioms are significant in deontic logic. More precisely, reading
✷A as “it is obligatory that A”, D is the characteristic axiom of deontic logic
¬(✷A ∧ ✷¬A), expressing that something and its negation cannot at the same
time be obligatory; and P is the axiom ¬✷⊥, expressing that something im-
possible cannot be obligatory. Although the axioms P and D are equivalent in
normal modal logic, this does not hold in the non-normal setting. The system
EMNP is considered as a meaningful minimal system of Deontic Logic [15, 26].
Finally, although the rules D+n have never been considered “officially” in the
literature, (but see [15] and [16]), they properly generalise the axiom D for sys-
tems without C, expressing that there cannot be n incompatible obligations: if
¬(A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) then ¬(✷A1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷An).
NNMLs have a well-understood semantics defined in terms of neighbourhood
models [4, 28]: in these models each world w has an associated set of neighbour-
hoods N (w), each one of them being a set of worlds/states. If we accept the
traditional interpretation of a “proposition” as a set of worlds (= its truth set),
we can think of each neighbourhood in N (w) as the proposition: a formula ✷A
is true in a world w if “the proposition” A, i.e. the truth-set of A, belongs to
N (w). The classical cube and all mentioned extensions can be modelled by
imposing additional closure properties of the set of neighbourhoods.
In this work we adopt a variant of the neighbourhood semantics defined
in terms of bi-neighbourhood models [7]: in these structures each world has
associated a set of pairs of neighbourhoods. The intuition is that the two
components of a pair provide positive and negative support for a modal formula.
This variant is significant and more natural for “non-monotonic” logics (i.e. not
containing axiomM). The reason is that, instead of specifying exactly the truth
sets in N (w), the pairs of neighbourhoods specify lower and upper bounds of
truth sets, so that the same pair may be a “witness” for several propositions.
For this reason, the generation of countermodels, one of the goals of the present
work, is easier in the bi-neighbourhood semantics than in the standard one. Bi-
neighbourhood models can be transformed into standard ones and vice-versa.
The proof-theory of NNMLs is not quite as developed as their semantics,
apart from early works on regular modal logics like [10]. In particular, it is curi-
ous to note that, although some proof-systems for NNMLs have been proposed in
the past, countermodel generation has been rarely addressed and computational
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properties of proof systems are seldom analysed. Indeed, the works [21, 12, 25, 7]
propose countermodel extraction in the neighbourhood semantics, but all of
them require either a complicated procedure or an extended language with la-
bels. The recent [22] presents a nested sequent calculus for a logic combining
normal and monotone non-normal modal logic that supports countermodel ex-
traction. However the nested sequent structure is not suitable for logics lacking
monotonicity. In contrast, cut-free sequent/linear nested calculi for the classical
cube and its extensions with standard axioms of normal modal logics (the non-
normal counterpart of logics from K to S5), including deontic axioms D and
P, are studied in [17, 18, 23, 27]. In particular, [27] focuses on cut-free sequent
calculi on calculi for deontic logic, partially covering the family of systems de-
fined in this paper. However, neither semantic completeness, nor countermodel
extraction, nor complexity are studied in the mentioned papers.
In this work, we intend to fill this gap by proposing modular calculi for the
classical cube and the mentioned deontic extensions that provide direct coun-
termodel extraction and are of optimal complexity. Our calculi are semantically
based on bi-neighbourhood models, and have two syntactic features: they ma-
nipulate hypersequents and sequents may contain blocks of ✷-ed formulas in
the antecedent. A hypersequent [2] is just a multiset of sequents and can be
understood as a (meta-logical) disjunction of sequents. Sequents within hyper-
sequents can be read as formulas of the logic and, for this reason, our calculi are
“almost” internal. Blocks of formulas are interpreted as conjunctions of negative
✷-ed formulas. Intuitively, each block represents a neighbourhood satisfying one
or more ✷-ed formulas, and this allows for the formulation of modular calculi.
It is worth noticing that the calculi have also good proof-theoretical properties,
as they support a syntactic proof of cut admissibility.
We make clear that, for the purpose of having sound and complete calculi
for NNMLs, neither hypersequents, nor blocks are necessary, as for instance the
sequent calculi in [21, 27, 17, 18] show. But as we shall see, the hypersequent
framework is very adequate to extract countermodels from a single failed proof,
ensuring at the same time good computational and structural properties. As
a matter of fact, even in the bi-neighbourhood semantics, non-normal modal
logics, in particular without monotonicity, ultimately need to consider truth
sets of formulas. Hence, in order to obtain calculi suitable for a reasonably
straightforward countermodel construction, we need to be able to represent
essentially all worlds of a possible model in the data structure used by the
calculus. While this could also be accomplished by other types of calculi, for
obtaining small countermodels in non-monotonic logics it is crucial that every
world (represented by a component of the hypersequent) has access to all other
worlds which have been constructed so far. This very strongly suggests a flat
structure, as given by hypersequents, in contrast for instance, with the tree-like
structure of nested sequents.
A further advantage of using hypersequents is that all rules become invert-
ible, thus there is no need for backtracking in proof search. For the same reason,
the hypersequent calculi provide direct countermodel extraction: from one failed
proof we can directly extract a countermodel in the bi-neighbourhood semantics
of the sequent/formula at the root of the derivation. A particular case is the one
of regular logics, i.e., logics containing both M and C (whence normal modal
logic K as well). These systems admit a relational semantics. We show how to
extract a relational countermodel from a failed proof-search in the calculi for
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these logics as well.
We also consider the problem of obtaining optimal decision procedures. The
known complexity bounds are not the same for logics without and with axiom C.
Namely (see [35]), the former are coNP, whereas the latter are PSPACE, a fact
that also follows by a general result on non-iterative modal logics [32]. For logics
with C (belonging to our cube), a PSPACE decision procedure can be obtained
by standard proof-search in sequent calculi, like those ones in [21]. Therefore
we concentrate on the more significant case of logics without C: it turns out
that for these logics our calculi provide an optimal coNP decision procedure. For
logics including C, we can still obtain an optimal PSPACE decision procedure by
adopting an unkleene’d version of our calculi, which “sacrifices” the invertibility
of rules.
We finish this work by presenting a formal translation between hypersequent
calculi, restricted to the classical cube, and the labelled calculi LSE∗, presented
in [7]. As mentioned above, our calculi have an internal flavour, since sequents
have an interpretation within the logics (although hypersequents do not). La-
belled systems, on the other hand, are intrinsically external due to the use of
symbols that are not in the base logical language, in the form of labels. Es-
tablishing translations between sequent based systems and labelled systems is
often a hard task [34, 5, 13]. Indeed, hyper/nested sequents typically carry
the semantical information within their structure, while labels explicitly mark
semantical behaviours to formulas. The results presented in this work shows
that our hypersequent calculi provide a compact encoding of derivations in the
labelled framework.
All in all, we believe that the structure of our calculi, namely hypersequents
with blocks, is adequate for NNMLs from a semantical, computational and
a proof-theoretical point of view since it: (i) has a semantic interpretation;
(ii) allows direct countermodel generation; (iii) supports optimal complexity
decision procedures; (iv) has good proof-theoretical properties; and (v) has a
natural translation to labelled systems present in the literature.
This article is a thoroughly revised and significantly extended version of the
conference paper [6]. Some of the most significant extensions with respect to
that work are the modular extension of all the results to twice the amount of
axioms, the extension to the relational semantics for regular logics, and the
investigation of the formal relation with the calculi presented in [7], in the form
of mutual simulation.
The plan of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the logical
systems considered in this work. In Section 3, we present both standard neigh-
bourhood semantics and its bi-neighbourhood variant. In Section 4, we intro-
duce hypersequent calculi and we prove the main proof-theoretical properties,
including cut-admissibility, from which also follows their syntactic completeness.
In Section 5, we show how the calculi can provide a decision procedure for the
respective logics and we analyse their complexity. In Section 6, we show how the
calculi can be used to extract directly countermodels from failed proofs, which
is one of the main goals of this work; additionally, this directly yields semantic
completeness. Finally in Section 7 we explore the relation of hypersequent cal-
culi with previously introduced labelled calculi for the classical cube of NNML,
while Section 8 contains some final discussion and conclusions.
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A↔ B
RE
✷A↔ ✷B
¬(A1 ∧ ... ∧ An)
RD+n (n ≥ 1)¬(✷A1 ∧ ... ∧ ✷An)
M ✷(A ∧B)→ ✷A C ✷A ∧ ✷B → ✷(A ∧B) N ✷⊤
T ✷A→ A D ¬(✷A ∧ ✷¬A) P ¬✷⊥
Figure 1: Modal axioms and rules.
2 Non-normal modal logics as axiom systems
In this section we introduce, axiomatically, the class of non-normal modal logics
we consider in this work.
Definition 2.1. Non-normal modal logics are defined over a propositional modal
language L, based on a set Atm = {p1, p2, p3, ...} of countably many proposi-
tional variables. The well-formed formulas of L are defined by the following
grammar
A ::= p | ⊥ | ⊤ | A ∧A | A ∨A | A→ A | ✷A.
In the following, we use A,B,C,D,E and p, q, r as metavariables for, respec-
tively, arbitrary formulas and atoms of L. We consider the standard abbrevia-
tions ¬A := A→ ⊥, A↔ B := (A→ B) ∧ (B → A), and ✸A := ¬✷¬A.
Definition 2.2. The family of non-normal modal logics is generated by
1. any axiomatization of classical propositional logic (CPL) formulated in
the language L, comprising the rule of modus ponens (MP )
A→ B A
MP
B
2. The rule RE of Figure 1.
3. Any or none of the other axioms or rules of Figure 1.
The minimal non-normal modal logic is E, defined by only items 1 and 2 above.
We denote non-normal modal logics by EX, where X stands for the (possi-
bly empty) additional set of axioms and rules from Figure 1. We adopt the
convention of replacing E with M for systems containing axiom M, which are
consequently denoted by MX. We also drop the “R” of rule RD+n . E.g., we
writeMD+
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for the logic given by extending E with the axiomM and rule RD+3 .
In addition, given a non-normal modal logic L, we will write L∗ to indicate an
arbitrary extension of L with some other axioms.
As usual, we say that a formula A is provable in L (denoted by ⊢L A) if
it is an instance of an axiom of L or it is obtained from previous formulas by
applying the rules of L.
Logic E is the weakest system of the so-called classical cube [4, 23], generated
by any combination of axioms M , C, and N , as shown in Figure 2.
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EM
EC EN
MC MN
ECN
MCN (K)
Figure 2: The classical cube.
As it is well known, the axioms M and N are respectively equivalent to the
rules of monotonicity RM and necessitation RN
RM
A→ B
✷A→ ✷B
RN
A
✷A
Moreover, axiom K: ✷(A → B) → ✷A → ✷B is derivable in MC. As a
consequence, the top system MCN coincides with the minimal normal modal
logic K.
In the following, we call monotonic any system containing axiom M (and
non-monotonic otherwise), we call regular any system containing both axioms
M and C, and we call normal any system containing M , C, and N .
In the present work, we will in particular consider extensions of the basic
classical cube with any combination of the axioms T , D, P , and for every n ∈ N,
n ≥ 1, the rule RD+n (Figure 2).
The logics given by the rules RD+n have a peculiar interest in deontic logic
since the latter exclude the possiblity of having n obligations that cannot be
realised all together. Let us consider the following example, essentially from
Hansson [16, p. 41]: (1) I have to keep my mobile switched on (as I’m waiting
for an urgent call), (2) I have to attend my child schoolplay, (3) being in the
audience of a schoolplay I must keep my mobile switched off. Representing these
three claims by mobile on, schoolplay, and ¬(mobile on∧schoolplay), by using
rule RD+3 , it can be concluded that the three obligations are incompatible:
¬(✷mobile on ∧✷schoolplay ∧ ✷¬(mobile on ∧ schoolplay))
This conclusion cannot be obtained in any non-normal modal logic without
RD+3 or C, even if it contains both deontic axioms D and P .
While rules RD+n are entailed by axioms D and P in normal modal logics,
this is not the case in non-normal modal logics, therefore they may be considered
explicitly. It is also worth noting that the axioms D and P are equivalent in
normal modal logics, but not in non-normal ones.
The relations among the systems defined by adding D, P , and RD+n to the
systems of the classical cube are displayed in Figure 3. Finally, observe also
that all D, P , and RD+n are entailed by axiom T .
3 Semantics
The standard semantic characterisation of non-normal modal logics is given in
terms of neighbourhood models [28], also called minimal [4], or Scott-Montague.
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EM
EC EN
MC MN
ECN
MCN
EP ≡ ED+1
ED
ED+2
ED+n
MD ≡MD+2
END
ENPECD
ECP ≡ ECD+n
ECND ≡ ECNP
EPD
MCD ≡MCP ≡MCD+n
MP
MND
KD ≡ KP ≡ KD+n
MNP
MD+n
MND+n
Figure 3: Diagram of deontic systems ( “Pantheon”).
In this work they will be called standard neighbourhood, or just standard mod-
els. Standard neighbourhood models are a generalisation of Kripke models
for normal modal logics, where the binary relation is replaced by a so-called
neighbourhood function, which assigns to each world a set of sets of worlds.
Intuitively, the neighbourhood function assigns to each world the propositions
that are necessary/obligatory/etc. in it. Standard neighbourhood models are
defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Standard Neighbourhood Model). A standard neighbourhood
model is a triple M = 〈W ,N ,V〉, where W is a non-empty set, whose elements
are called worlds, N is a function W −→ PP(W), called neighbourhood func-
tion, and V : Atm −→ P(W) is a valuation function for propositional variables
of L. The forcing relationM, w st A is defined as follows, where JAKM denotes
the set {v | M, v st A}, also called the truth set of A:
M, w st p iff w ∈ V (p);
M, w 6st ⊥;
M, w st ⊤;
M, w st A→ B iff M, w 6st A or M, w st B;
M, w st ✷A iff JAKM ∈ N (w).
We adopt the standard definitions of validity.
Definition 3.2. We say that a formula A is valid in a model M = 〈W ,N ,V〉,
written M |= A, if M, w  A for all w ∈ W . We say that A is valid in a class
of models C, written C |= A, if M |= A for all M∈ C.
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The class of all standard models characterises the basic logic E. For the
extensions of logic E, we need to consider some additional closure properties of
the neighbourhood function, as specified in the next definition.
Definition 3.3 (Semantic conditions for Extensions). Given a standard neigh-
bourhood model M = 〈W ,N ,V〉, We consider the following conditions on N
(M) If α ∈ N (w) and α ⊆ β, then β ∈ N (w).
(C) If α, β ∈ N (w), then α ∩ β ∈ N (w).
(N) W ∈ N (w).
(T ) If α ∈ N (w), then w ∈ α.
(P ) ∅ /∈ N (w).
(D) If α ∈ N (w), then W \ α /∈ N (w).
(RD+n ) If α1, ..., αn ∈ N (w), then α1 ∩ ... ∩ αn 6= ∅.
The properties (M), (C), (N) are respectively called supplementation, closure
under intersection, and containing the unit ; accordingly, a standard model is
supplemented, closed under intersection, or contains the unit if it satisfies the
corresponding property.
In the following, for every logic L we denote by Cst
L
the class of standard
models for L.
Theorem 3.1. Logic E∗ is sound and complete with respect to the correspond-
ing standard neighbourhood models, that is: |=Cst
E∗
A if and only if ⊢E∗ A.
A proof of this result can be found in [4] for the systems of the classical cube
and their extensions with axioms T , P , D. The proof can be easily extended
also to the rules RD+n .
A special case is given by regular logics MC∗ (i.e. possibly lacking the
necessitation axiom N) For these logics there exists a relational semantics which
goes back to Kripke himself: in [19] he introduces relational models with so-
called non-normal worlds, with the aim of characterising a family of Lewis’ and
Lemmon’s systems in which necessitation fails or is validated only in a restricted
form. Here we consider a definition from Priest [31, Section 4.2].
Definition 3.4. A relational model with non-normal worlds is a tuple M =
〈W ,W i,R,V〉, where W is a non-empty set of worlds, W i ⊆ W is the set of
non-normal worlds, R ⊆ W ×W is a binary relation, and V : Atm −→ P(W)
is a valuation function for propositional variables. The forcing relation w r A
is defined as in Definition 3.1, except for boxed formulas, for which it is defined
as follows:
w r ✷A iff w /∈ W i and for all v ∈ W , if wRv then v  A.
Observe that in impossible worlds all boxed formulas are falsified. Validity
is defined as usual: we say that a formula is valid in a model if it is true in
all worlds (no matter if they are normal or non-normal). 1 It is easy to verify
that non-normal relational models validate axiomsM and C but do not validate
axiom N . Notice also that in case W i is empty we have the standard definition
of Kripke models for normal modal logics.
A semantic characterisation of some extensions of logicMC by means of non-
normal relational models can be given by considering the usual frame properties
of Kripke semantics.
1This is one of the two definitions of validity considered by Priest [31].
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Theorem 3.2 ([10, pp.300]). Every regular logic MC∗ is sound and complete
with respect to the corresponding relational models.
A variant of the neighbourhood semantics, called bi-neighbourhood seman-
tics, was introduced in [7]. Instead of a set of neighbourhoods, worlds in bi-
neighbourhood models are equipped with a set of pairs of neighbourhoods. The
intuition is that the two components of a pair provide “positive” and “negative”
support for a modal formula. As we shall see, a technical motivation to con-
sider bi-neighhbourhood models is that they are more suitable for countermodel
generation than standard ones, but they also have an interest in their own.
Definition 3.5. A bi-neighbourhood model is a triple M = 〈W ,N ,V〉, where
W is a non-empty set, V is a valuation function and N is a function assigning
to each world w a subset of P(W)×P(W). The forcing relationM, w bi A is
defined as in Definition 3.1 except for the modality, for which the clause is:
M, w bi ✷A iff there is (α, β) ∈ N (w) s.t. α ⊆ JAKM ⊆ W \ β.
The above definition introduces the general class of bi-neighbourhood mod-
els, thus characterising the basic logic E. For extensions we need to consider the
further conditions contained in next definition.
Definition 3.6 (Bi-neighbourhood conditions for extensions). Given a bi-neigh-
bourhood model M = 〈W ,N ,V〉, we consider the following conditions:
(M) If (α, β) ∈ N (w), then β = ∅.
(N) There is α ⊆ W such that for all w ∈ W , (α, ∅) ∈ N (w).
(C) If (α, β), (γ, δ) ∈ N (w), then (α ∩ γ, β ∪ δ) ∈ N (w).
(T) If (α, β) ∈ N (w), then w ∈ α.
(P) If (α, β) ∈ N (w), then α 6= ∅.
(D) If (α, β), (γ, δ) ∈ N (w), then α ∩ γ 6= ∅ or β ∩ δ 6= ∅.
(RD+n ) If (α1, β1), ..., (αn, βn) ∈ N (w), then α1 ∩ ... ∩ αn 6= ∅.
In the following, we simply write w  A and JAK, omitting both the model
M and the subscript bi, st, or r whenever they are clear from the context.
For every condition (X) above, we call X-model any bi-neighbourhood model
statisfying (X). The class of bi-neighbourhood models for a given non-normal
modal logic L is determined by the conditions corresponding to the axioms of
L. We denote by Cbi
L
the class of bi-neighbourhood models for L.
We now prove that non-normal modal logics are sound and complete with re-
spect to the corresponding classes of bi-neighbourhood models. For the systems
of the classical cube, a direct proof based on the canonical model construction
can be found in [7]. Here we give an indirect argument that relies on the com-
pleteness of non-normal modal logics with respect to standard models and the
mutual transformation between standard and bi-neighbourhood-models.
First of all, given a standard model, an equivalent bi-neighbourhood model
can be obtained simply by taking as pairs each neighbourhood and its comple-
ment (for the classical cube this transformation is already introduced in [7]).
Proposition 3.3. Let Mst = 〈W ,Nst,V〉 be a standard model, and Mbi =
〈W ,Nbi,V〉 be the bi-neighbourhood model defined by taking the same W and
V and, for all w ∈ W ,
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Nbi(w) =
{
{(α,W \ α) | α ∈ Nst(w)} if Mst is not supplemented.
{(α, ∅) | α ∈ Nst(w)} if Mst is supplemented.
Then for every formula A of L and every w ∈ W , Mbi, w  A if and only if
Mst, w  A. Moreover, for every X∈ {M , C, N , T , P , D, RD+n }, if Mst
satisfies the condition corresponding to X in the standard semantics, then Mbi
is a bi-neighbourhood X-model.
Proof. The equivalence is proved by induction on A. The basic cases A = p,⊥,⊤
are trivial since the evaluation V is the same in the two models, and the induc-
tive cases of boolean connectives are straightforward by applying the induction
hypothesis. We consider the case A = ✷B. IfMst is not supplemented we have:
Mbi, w  ✷B iff (JBKbi,W \ JBKbi) ∈ Nbi(w) iff JBKbi ∈ Nst(w) iff (inductive
hypothesis) JBKst ∈ Nst(w) iff Mst, w  ✷B. If Mst is supplemented we have:
Mbi, w  ✷B iff there is (α, ∅) ∈ Nbi(w) such that α ⊆ JBKbi iff α ∈ Nst(w)
and (inductive hypothesis) α ⊆ JBKst iff (by supplementation) JBKst ∈ Nst(w)
iff Mst, w  ✷B.
Now we show that Mst satisfies the right properties. For axiom M the
proof is immediate by definition of Nbi. For the following conditions we just
consider the non-supplemented case, whereas the supplemented case is an easy
simplification.
(N) (W , ∅) ∈ Nbi(w) because W ∈ Nst(w).
(C) If (α,W \ α), (β,W \ β) ∈ Nbi(w), then α, β ∈ Nst(w), that implies
α ∩ β ∈ Nst(w). Thus (α ∩ β,W \ (α ∩ β)) = (α ∩ β,W \ α ∪W \ β) ∈ Nbi(w).
(T ) If (α,W \ α) ∈ Nbi(w), then α ∈ Nst(w), thus w ∈ α.
(P ) If (α,W \ α) ∈ Nbi(w), then α ∈ Nst(w), thus α 6= ∅.
(D) If (α,W \α), (β,W \β) ∈ Nbi(w), then α, β ∈ Nst(w). Thus β 6=W\α,
that implies α ∩ β 6= ∅ or W \ α ∩W \ β 6= ∅.
(RD+n ) If (α1,W \ α1), ..., (αn,W \ αn) ∈ Nbi(w), then α1, ..., αn ∈ Nst(w),
thus α1 ∩ ... ∩ αn 6= ∅.
For the opposite direction we propose two transformations: a more general
one, independent of the language, and a “finer” one which is defined with respect
to a set of formulas. The general transformation is new, whereas the second one
is already introduced in [7] for the classical cube, where the equivalence proof
is also sketched. The general transformation is as follows.
Proposition 3.4. Let Mbi = 〈W ,Nbi,V〉 be a bi-neighbourhood model, and
Mst = 〈W ,Nst,V〉 be the standard model defined by taking the same W and
V and, for all w ∈ W ,
Nst(w) = {γ ⊆ W | there is (α, β) ∈ Nbi(w) such that α ⊆ γ ⊆ W \ β}.
Then for every formula A of L and every w ∈ W , Mst, w  A if and only if
Mbi, w  A. Moreover, for every X∈ {M , C, N , T , P , D, RD+n }, if Mbi is a
bi-neighbourhood X-model, then Mst satisfies the condition corresponding to
X in the standard semantics.
Proof. The equivalence is proved by induction on A. As before, we only consider
the inductive step where A ≡ ✷B. We have: Mst, w  ✷B iff JBKst ∈ Nst(w)
iff (i.h.) JBKbi ∈ Nst(w) iff there is (α, β) ∈ Nbi(w) such that α ⊆ JBKbi ⊆ W\β
iff Mbi, w  ✷B.
Now we prove that Mst satisfies the right properties.
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(M) LetMbi be a M-model, and assume γ ∈ Nst(w) and γ ⊆ δ. Then there
is (α, ∅) ∈ Nbi(w) such that α ⊆ γ ⊆ W \∅. Thus α ⊆ δ ⊆ W \∅, which implies
δ ∈ Nst(w).
(N) Let Mbi be a N-model. Then there is (α, ∅) ∈ Nbi(w). Since α ⊆ W ⊆
W \ ∅, by definition W ∈ Nst(w).
(C) Let Mbi be a C-model, and assume γ, δ ∈ Nst(w). Then there are
(α1, β1), (α2, β2) ∈ Nbi(w) such that α1 ⊆ γ ⊆ W \ β1, α2 ⊆ δ ⊆ W \ β2.
By condition (C), (α1 ∩ α2, β1 ∪ β2) ∈ Nbi(w), where α1 ∩ α2 ⊆ γ ∩ δ, and
γ ∩ δ ⊆ W \ β1 ∩W \ β2 =W \ β1 ∪ β2. Then γ ∩ δ ∈ Nst(w).
(T ) Let Mbi be a T-model, and assume γ ∈ Nst(w). Then there is (α, β) ∈
Nbi(w) such that α ⊆ γ ⊆ W \ β. By condition (T), w ∈ α, then w ∈ γ.
(P ) Let Mbi be a P-model, and assume towards contradiction that ∅ ∈
Nst(w). Then there is (α, β) ∈ Nbi(w) such that α ⊆ ∅ ⊆ W \ β. Thus α = ∅,
against condition (P).
(D) LetMbi be a D-model, and assume towards contradiction that γ,W\γ ∈
Nst(w). Then there are (α1, β1), (α2, β2) ∈ Nbi(w) such that α1 ⊆ γ ⊆ W \ β1,
α2 ⊆ W \γ ⊆ W \β2. Then α1 ∩α2 = ∅ and β1 ∩β2 = ∅, against condition (D).
(RD+n ) Let Mbi be a RD
+
n -model, and assume γ1, ..., γn ∈ Nst(w). Then
there are (α1, β1), ..., (αn, βn) ∈ Nbi(w) such that αi ⊆ γ ⊆ W \ βi for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n. By condition (RD+n ), α1 ∩ ... ∩ αn 6= ∅. Then γ1 ∩ ... ∩ γn 6= ∅.
For the non-monotonic case, we provide another transformation, defined with
respect to any set of formulas S closed under subformulas. This transformation
in general produces standard models with a smaller neighbourhood function.
Proposition 3.5. Let Mbi = 〈W ,Nbi,V〉 be a bi-neighbourhood model and
S be a set of formulas of L closed under subformulas. We define the standard
modelMst = 〈W ,Nst,V〉 with the sameW and V and by taking, for all w ∈ W ,
Nst(w) = {JAKbi | ✷A ∈ S and Mbi, w  ✷A}.
Then for every formula A ∈ S and every world w ∈ W , Mst, w  A if and
only if Mbi, w  A. Moreover, (N) if ✷⊤ ∈ S and Mbi is a N-model, then
Mst contains the unit; (C) if ✷A,✷B ∈ S implies ✷(A ∧ B) ∈ S and Mbi
is a C-model, then Mst is closed under intersection; (T/P/D/RD+n ) If Mbi is
a T/P/D/RD+n -model, then Mst satisfies the corresponding condition in the
standard semantics.
Proof. The equivalence is proved by induction on A. The basic cases are im-
mediate. If A ≡ B ◦ C, where ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→}, the claims holds by applying
the inductive hypothesis since B,C ∈ S because S is closed under subformulas.
If A ≡ ✷B, then B ∈ S and, by inductive hypothesis, JBKst = JBKbi. Thus
Mst, w  ✷B iff JBKst ∈ Nst(w) iff JBKbi ∈ Nst(w) iff there is ✷C ∈ S such
that JCKbi = JBKbi and Mst, w  ✷C iff Mst, w  ✷B.
(N) LetMbi be a N-model. ThenMbi, w  ✷⊤. Since ✷⊤ ∈ S, by definition
J⊤Kbi =W ∈ Nst(w).
(C) Assume α, β ∈ Nst(w). Then there are ✷A,✷B ∈ S such that α = JAKbi,
β = JBKbi, and Mbi, w  ✷A, Mbi, w  ✷B, that is Mbi, w  ✷A ∧ ✷B.
Since Mbi is a C-model we have Mbi, w  ✷(A ∧ B). By the properties of S,
✷(A ∧ B) ∈ S. Then by definition JA ∧ BKbi ∈ Nst(w), where JA ∧ BKbi =
JAKbi ∩ JBKbi = α ∩ β.
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(T) Assume α ∈ Nst(w). Then α = JAKbi for some A such that ✷A ∈ S and
Mbi, w  ✷A. Since Mbi is a T-model, Mbi, w  A, that is w ∈ JAKbi = α.
(P) Assume by contradiction that ∅ ∈ Nst(w). Then there is ✷A ∈ S such
that Mbi, w  ✷A and JAKbi = ∅ = J⊥Kbi. Thus Mbi, w  ✷⊥, against the
soundness of axiom P with respect to P-models.
(D) Assume α,W \ α ∈ Nst(w). Then there are ✷A,✷B ∈ S such that
α = JAKbi, W \ α = JBKbi, and Mbi, w  ✷A, Mbi, w  ✷B. Then JAKbi =
W \ JBKbi = J¬BKbi, that is Mbi, w  ✷¬B, against the soundness of axiom D
with respect to D-models.
(RD+n ) Assume α1, ..., αn ∈ Nst(w). Then there are ✷A1, ...,✷An ∈ S such
that αi = JAiKbi and Mbi, w  ✷Ai for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, that is Mbi, w 
✷A1 ∧ ... ∧ ✷An. Then Mbi 6|= ¬(✷A1 ∧ ... ∧ ✷An), and since Mbi is a RD+n -
model,Mbi 6|= ¬(A1∧...∧An), that is JA1Kbi∩...∩JAnKbi = α1∩...∩αn 6= ∅.
For the monotonic case, an analogous result could be obtained by considering
the supplementation of the neighbourhood function in the above proposition.
That is we can consider
N ′st(w) = {α ⊆ W | there is ✷A ∈ S such that Mbi, w  ✷A and JAKbi ⊆ α}.
However, in this case the advantage in the size of the neighbourhood function
with respect to the transformation in Proposition 3.4 is not as relevant as for
the non-monotonic case.
From Propositions 3.3 and 3.4, standard and bi-neighbourhood semantics
are equivalent, in the sense that a formula is valid in a certain class of standard
models if and only if it is valid in the corresponding class of bi-neighbourhood
models. Since non-normal modal logics are characterised by standard models,
we obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.6 (Characterisation). Every non-normal modal logic L is sound
and complete with respect to the corresponding class of bi-neighbourhood mod-
els, that is: for every A ∈ L, |=Cbi
L
A if and only if ⊢L A.
We conclude this section with a few observations. First of all, the bi-
neighbourhood/neighbourhood semantics is (more) significant for the non-mono-
tonic systems, that is lacking the axiom M : for the monotonic ones, the truth
condition for ✷ in bi-neighbourhood-models boils down to the well-known ∃∀-
definition found in the literature (see e.g. [28]). Moreover, by the transformation
presented in Proposition 3.4, elements of bi-neighbourhood pairs can be seen as
lower and upper bounds of neighbourhoods of standard models.
These transformations have also an interest in proof-search: as we shall see in
the following, given a failed proof in our calculi, it is possible to directly extract a
countermodel in the bi-neighbourhood semantics, that can be transformed into
an equivalent standard countermodel as a later step. Furthermore, whereas in a
standard model each (non-equivalent) ✷-ed formula must be “witnessed” by a
different neighbourhood, the same bi-neighbourhood pair can “witness” several
boxed formulas. For this reason, bi-neighbourhood countermodels extracted
from failed proofs have typically a smaller neighbourhood function than the
corresponding standard models.
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H.E := {propositional rules, L✷, R✷}. H.M := {propositional rules, L✷, R✷m}.
H.EN∗ := H.E∗ ∪ {N}. H.MN∗ := H.M∗ ∪ {N}.
H.EC∗ := H.E∗ ∪ {C}. H.MC∗ := H.M∗ ∪ {C}.
H.ET∗ := H.E∗ ∪ {T}. H.MT∗ := H.M∗ ∪ {T}.
H.EP∗ := H.E∗ ∪ {P}. H.MP∗ := H.M∗ ∪ {P}.
H.ED∗ := H.E∗ ∪ {D1, D2}. H.MD
∗ := H.M∗ ∪ {D+1 , D
+
2 }.
H.ED+
n
∗
:= H.E∗ ∪ {D+i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. H.MD
+
n
∗
:= H.M∗ ∪ {D+i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Table 1: Hypersequent calculi H.E∗.
4 Hypersequent calculi
In order to define our calculi, we extend the structure of sequents in two ways.
Firstly, sequents can contain so-called blocks of formulas in addition to formulas
of L. Secondly, we use hypersequents rather than simple sequents.
Definition 4.1. A block is a structure 〈Σ〉, where Σ is a finite multiset of
formulas of L. A sequent is a pair Γ ⇒ ∆, where Γ is a finite multiset of
formulas and blocks, and ∆ is a finite multiset of formulas. A hypersequent is a
finite multiset of sequents, and is written
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 | . . . | Γn ⇒ ∆n.
Given a hypersequent H = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 | . . . | Γn ⇒ ∆n, we call components of H
the sequents Γi ⇒ ∆i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Observe that blocks can occur only in the antecedent of sequents and not in
their succedent. Both blocks and sequents, but not hypersequents, can be in-
terpreted as formulas of L. The formula interpretation of sequents is as follows:
i(A1, . . . , An, 〈Σ〉1, . . . , 〈Σ〉m ⇒ B1, . . . , Bk) =
A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An ∧ ✷
∧
Σ1 ∧ . . . ∧✷
∧
Σm → B1 ∨ . . . ∨Bk.
By contrast, there is no formula interpretation for hypersequents in L. The rea-
son is that non-normal modalities are not strong enough to express the structural
connective “|” of hypersequents: Intuitively, every component of a hypersequent
corresponds to a world in a model, and all worlds of a model are potentially
relevant for calculating the truth set of a formula, so we would need a global
modality to express the hypersequent structure.
The semantic interpretation of sequents and hypersequents is as follows.
Definition 4.2. We say that a sequent S is valid in a possible-worlds model
M (written M |= S) if for every world w of M, M, w  i(S). We say that a
hypersequent H is valid in M if for some component S of H , M |= S. Finally,
we say that an inference rule R is sound with respect to a model M (resp. a
class of models C) if in case all premisses of R are valid in M (resp. C), then
the conclusion of R is also valid in M (resp. C).
For every logic E∗, the corresponding hypersequent calculus H.E∗ is defined
by a subset of the rules in Figure 4, as summarised in Table 1.
The rules are given in their cumulative, or kleene’d, versions, i.e. the principal
formulas or blocks are copied to the premiss(es). The propositional rules are
just the hypersequent versions of kleene’d rules of sequent calculi.
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Propositional rules
init
G | Γ, p⇒ p,∆
L⊥
G | Γ,⊥ ⇒ ∆
R⊤
G | Γ⇒ ⊤,∆
G | Γ, A→ B ⇒ A,∆ G | Γ, A→ B,B ⇒ ∆
L →
G | Γ, A→ B ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, A⇒ B,A→ B,∆
R→
G | Γ⇒ A→ B,∆
G | Γ, A ∧B,A,B ⇒ ∆
L∧
G | Γ, A ∧B ⇒ ∆
G | Γ⇒ A,A ∧ B,∆ G | Γ⇒ B,A ∧B,∆
R∧
G | Γ⇒ A ∧B,∆
G | Γ, A ∨B,A⇒ ∆ G | Γ, A ∨ B,B ⇒ ∆
L∨
G | Γ, A ∨B ⇒ ∆
G | Γ⇒ A,B,A ∨B,∆
R∨
G | Γ⇒ A ∨B,∆
Modal rules for the classical cube
G | Γ,✷A, 〈A〉 ⇒ ∆
L✷
G | Γ,✷A⇒ ∆
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Σ⇒ B
R✷m
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Σ⇒ B {G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | B ⇒ A}A∈Σ
R✷
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
G | Γ, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ∆
N
G | Γ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉, 〈Σ,Π〉 ⇒ ∆
C
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆
Modal rules for extensions
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉,Σ⇒ ∆
T
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | Σ⇒
P
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, 〈Σ1〉, . . . , 〈Σn〉 ⇒ ∆ | Σ1, . . . ,Σn ⇒
D+n
G | Γ, 〈Σ1〉, . . . , 〈Σn〉 ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆ | Σ,Π⇒ {G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆ | ⇒ A,B}A∈Σ,B∈Π
D2
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | Σ⇒ {G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | ⇒ A}A∈Σ
D1
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆
Figure 4: Rules of the hypersequent calculi H.E∗.
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As mentioned in the introduction, the hypersequent structure is not needed
to obtain a sound and complete calculus for the logics under investigation. More-
over, it can be checked that whenever a hypersequentH = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 | . . . | Γn ⇒
∆n is derivable, then there is some component Γi ⇒ ∆i which is derivable.
The choice of both the hypersequent structure and also of cumulative rules
is motivated by the possibility of directly obtaining countermodels of non-valid
formulas. In particular, the hypersequent structure allows us to make all rules
invertible. In this respect, observe that backward applications of rules R✷,
R✷m, P, D1, D2, and D
+
n create new components, but the principal component
in the conclusion is kept in the premiss in order keep the possibility of potential
alternative rule applications.
Similarly to propositional connectives, boxed formulas are handled by sep-
arate left and right rules. Observe that rule R✷ has multiple premisses, but
the number of the premisses is fixed by the cardinality of the principal block
〈Σ〉. The rule R✷m is a right rule for ✷ which replaces R✷ in the definition
of monotonic calculi. Apart from the distinction between monotonic and non-
monotonic calculi, the calculi are modular; in particular, extensions of H.E and
H.M do not require to modify the basic rules for ✷, being defined by simply
adding the rules corresponding to the additional axioms.
Every axiom has a corresponding rule, with the only exceptions of axiom D
and rules RD+n : axiom D needs both D1 and D2 in the non-monotonic case,
whereas it needs D+1 and D
+
2 in the monotonic case. Moreover, the rules RD
+
n
need D+m for every 1 ≤ m ≤ n. These requirements makes contraction admissi-
ble (see Proposition 4.3 and Section 4.1), and we could forego them by instead
adopting explicit contraction rules. Finally, as we shall see in the countermodel
extraction (see Section 6), the rule D1 is the syntactic counterpart of the prop-
erty (∅, ∅) /∈ N (w), which is satified by every bi-neighbourhood D-model.
Blocks have a central role in all modal rules. Modal rules essentially state
how to handle blocks. Notice that the only rule which expands blocks is C,
thus in absence of this rule the blocks occurring in a proof for a single formula
contain only one formula. The possibility of collecting formulas by means of
blocks allows us to avoid rules with n principal boxed formulas, as are common
in standard sequent calculi (compare [23]). As we shall see, blocks also allow
for an easy computation of the bi-neighbourhood function for the definition of
countermodels.
Derivations of modal axioms and rules are displayed in Figure 5. Note that
the simulations of the rules make use of the external weakening rule Ewk, which
is shown to be admissible in Prop. 4.3. In the derivations we further implicitly
make use of the following lemma, which states that initial hypersequents can be
generalised to arbitrary formulas.
Proposition 4.1. G | Γ, A⇒ A,∆ is derivable in H.E∗ for every A,Γ,∆, G.
Proof. By structural induction on A. If A = p,⊥,⊤, then G | Γ, A ⇒ A,∆ is
an initial hypersequent, whence it is derivable. If A = B ∧ C we consider the
following derivation
G | Γ, B ∧ C,B,C ⇒ B,B ∧C,∆ G | Γ, B ∧ C,B,C ⇒ C,B ∧ C,∆
R∧
G | Γ, B ∧C,B,C ⇒ B ∧ C,∆
L∧
G | Γ, B ∧ C ⇒ B ∧ C,∆
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(RE)
A⇒ B
Ewk
✷A, 〈A〉 ⇒ ✷B | A⇒ B
B ⇒ A
Ewk
✷A, 〈A〉 ⇒ ✷B | B ⇒ A
R✷
✷A, 〈A〉 ⇒ ✷B
L✷
✷A⇒ ✷B
(M)
✷(A ∧B), 〈A ∧ B〉 ⇒ ✷A | A ∧ B,A,B ⇒ A
L∧
✷(A ∧B), 〈A ∧ B〉 ⇒ ✷A | A ∧B ⇒ A
R✷m
✷(A ∧B), 〈A ∧B〉 ⇒ ✷A
L✷
✷(A ∧B)⇒ ✷A
(N)
〈⊤〉 ⇒ ✷⊤ | ⊤ ⇒ ⊤ 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ✷⊤ | ⊤ ⇒ ⊤
R✷
〈⊤〉 ⇒ ✷⊤
N
⇒ ✷⊤
(C)
. . . , 〈A,B〉 ⇒ ✷(A ∧B) | A,B ⇒ A ∧ B . . . | A ∧B ⇒ A . . . | A ∧B ⇒ B
R✷
✷A ∧ ✷B,✷A,✷B, 〈A〉, 〈B〉, 〈A,B〉 ⇒ ✷(A ∧B)
C
✷A ∧✷B,✷A,✷B, 〈A〉, 〈B〉 ⇒ ✷(A ∧B)
L✷
✷A ∧✷B,✷A,✷B, 〈A〉 ⇒ ✷(A ∧ B)
L✷
✷A ∧✷B,✷A,✷B ⇒ ✷(A ∧B)
L∧
✷A ∧✷B ⇒ ✷(A ∧ B)
(T )
✷A, 〈A〉, A⇒ A
T
✷A, 〈A〉 ⇒ A
L✷
✷A⇒ A
(P )
✷⊥, 〈⊥〉 ⇒ | ⊥ ⇒
P
✷⊥, 〈⊥〉 ⇒
L✷
✷⊥ ⇒
(D)
✷A ∧ ✷¬A,✷A,✷¬A, 〈A〉, 〈¬A〉 ⇒ | A⇒ A
L¬
✷A ∧ ✷¬A,✷A,✷¬A, 〈A〉, 〈¬A〉 ⇒ | A,¬A⇒
✷A ∧ ✷¬A,✷A,✷¬A, 〈A〉, 〈¬A〉 ⇒ | A⇒ A
R¬
✷A ∧ ✷¬A,✷A,✷¬A, 〈A〉, 〈¬A〉 ⇒ | ⇒ A,¬A
D2
✷A ∧ ✷¬A,✷A,✷¬A, 〈A〉, 〈¬A〉 ⇒
L✷
✷A ∧✷¬A,✷A,✷¬A, 〈A〉 ⇒
L✷
✷A ∧ ✷¬A,✷A,✷¬A⇒
L∧
✷A ∧✷¬A⇒
(RD+n )
A1, . . . , An ⇒
Ewk
✷A1 ∧ . . . ∧✷An,✷A1, . . . ,✷An, 〈A1〉, . . . , 〈An〉 ⇒ | A1, . . . , An ⇒
D+n
✷A1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷An,✷A1, . . . ,✷An, 〈A1〉, . . . , 〈An〉 ⇒
L∧ × n
✷A1 ∧ . . . ∧✷An,✷A1, . . . ,✷An ⇒
L∧ × n
✷A1 ∧ . . . ∧✷An ⇒
Figure 5: Derivations of modal axioms and rules.
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where the premisses are derivable by inductive hypothesis. The cases A = B∨C
or A = B ∧ C are analogous. If A = ✷B we consider the following derivation
G | Γ,✷B, 〈B〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | B ⇒ B G | Γ,✷B, 〈B〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | B ⇒ B
R✷
G | Γ,✷B, 〈B〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
L✷
G | Γ,✷B ⇒ ✷B,∆
where the premisses are derivable by inductive hypothesis.
The hypersequent calculi are sound with respect to the corresponding bi-
neighbourhood models.
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness). If H is derivable in H.EX∗, then it is valid in all
X-models.
Proof. The initial hypersequents are clearly valid. We show that all rules are
sound with respect to the corresponding bi-neighbourhood models. Since the
proof is standard for propositional rules, we just consider the modal rules.
(L✷) Assume M |= G | Γ,✷A, 〈A〉 ⇒ ∆. Then M |= G, or M |=
Γ,✷A, 〈A〉 ⇒ ∆. In the first case we are done. In the second case, M |=
i(Γ,✷A, 〈A〉 ⇒ ∆) = i(Γ,✷A,✷A⇒ ∆), which is equivalent to i(Γ,✷A⇒ ∆).
(R✷) Assume M |= G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Σ ⇒ B and M |= G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒
✷B,∆ | B ⇒ A for all A ∈ Σ. Then (i) M |= G, or (ii) M |= Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆,
or (iii) M |= Σ ⇒ B and M |= B ⇒ A for all A ∈ Σ. If (i) or (ii) we are
done. If (iii), then M |=
∧
Σ → B and M |= B → A for all A ∈ Σ, that is
M |=
∧
Σ ↔ B. Since RE is valid, M |= ✷
∧
Σ → ✷B = i(〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B). Thus
M |= i(Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆).
(R✷m) Analogous to R✷, by considering that in M-models M |=
∧
Σ → B
implies M |= ✷
∧
Σ→ ✷B.
(N) Suppose M is a N-model and assume M |= G | Γ, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ∆. Then
M |= G, orM |= Γ, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ∆. In the first case we are done. In the second case,
M |= i(Γ, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ∆), which is equivalent to ✷⊤ → i(Γ⇒ ∆). Since ✷⊤ is valid
in M, M |= Γ⇒ ∆.
(C) Suppose M is a C-model and assume M |= G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉, 〈Σ,Π〉 ⇒ ∆.
ThenM |= G orM |= Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉, 〈Σ,Π〉 ⇒ ∆. In the first case we are done. In
the second case, M |= i(Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉, 〈Σ,Π〉 ⇒ ∆) = i(Γ,✷
∧
Σ,✷
∧
Π,✷(
∧
Σ ∧∧
Π)⇒ ∆). This is equivalent to ✷
∧
Σ ∧ ✷
∧
Π ∧ ✷(
∧
Σ ∧
∧
Π)→ i(Γ⇒ ∆),
and since axiom C is valid inM, this is equivalent to ✷
∧
Σ∧✷
∧
Π→ i(Γ⇒ ∆).
Thus M |= i(Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆).
(T) Suppose M is a T-model and assume M |= G | Γ, 〈Σ〉,Σ ⇒ ∆. Then
M |= G or M |= Γ, 〈Σ〉,Σ ⇒ ∆. In the first case we are done. In the second
case, M |= i(Γ, 〈Σ〉,Σ ⇒ ∆) = ✷
∧
Σ ∧
∧
Σ → i(Γ ⇒ ∆). Since axiom T is
valid in M, this is equivalent to ✷
∧
Σ→ i(Γ⇒ ∆). Then M |= Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆.
(P) Suppose M is a P-model and assume M |= G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | Σ ⇒.
Then (i) M |= G, or (ii) M |= Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆, or (iii) M |= Σ ⇒. If (i) or (ii)
we are done. If (iii), then M |=
∧
Σ → ⊥. and by the validity of axiom P ,
M |= ✷
∧
Σ→ ⊥ = i(〈Σ〉 ⇒). Then M |= Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆.
(D+n ) SupposeM is a RD
+
n -model and assumeM |= G | Γ, 〈Σ1〉, . . . , 〈Σn〉 ⇒
∆ | Σ1, . . . ,Σn ⇒. Then (i)M |= G, or (ii)M |= Γ, 〈Σ1〉, . . . , 〈Σn〉 ⇒ ∆, or (iii)
M |= Σ1, . . . ,Σn ⇒. If (i) or (ii) we are done. If (iii), thenM |= ¬(
∧
Σ1∧ . . .∧
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∧
Σn). And by the soundness of rule RD
+
n , M |= ¬(✷
∧
Σ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷
∧
Σn) =
i(〈Σ1〉, . . . , 〈Σn〉 ⇒). Then M |= Γ, 〈Σ1〉, . . . , 〈Σn〉 ⇒ ∆.
(D2) Suppose M is a D-model and assume M |= G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆ |
Σ,Π⇒, and M |= G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆ | ⇒ A,B for all A ∈ Σ, B ∈ Π. Then (i)
M |= G, or (ii) M |= Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆, or (iii) M |= Σ,Π⇒ and M |= ⇒ A,B
for all A ∈ Σ, B ∈ Π. If (i) or (ii) we are done. If (iii), thenM |=
∧
Σ∧
∧
Π→ ⊥
and M |= A ∨ B for all A ∈ Σ, B ∈ Π. Thus M |=
∧
Σ ↔ ¬
∧
Π. By the
soundness of axiom D, M |= ✷
∧
Σ ∧ ✷
∧
Π → ⊥ = i(〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒). Then
M |= Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆.
(D1) Assume M |= G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | Σ ⇒, and M |= G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | ⇒ A
for all A ∈ Σ. Then (i)M |= G, or (ii)M |= Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆, or (iii)M |= Σ⇒ and
M |= ⇒ A for all A ∈ Σ. If (i) or (ii) we are done. If (iii), then M |=
∧
Σ→ ⊥
and M |=
∧
Σ, which is impossible. Then (i) or (ii) holds.
4.1 Structural properties and syntactic completeness
We now investigate the structural properties of our calculi. We first show that
weakening and contraction are height-preserving admissible, both in their in-
ternal and in their external variants, and that all rules are invertible. We then
prove that the cut rule is admissible, which allows us to directly prove the
completeness of the calculi with respect to the corresponding axiomatisations.
Definition 4.3. The weight wg of a formula is recursively defined as wg(⊥) =
wg(⊤) = wg(p) = 0; for ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→}, wg(A ◦ B) = wg(A) + wg(B) + 1;
wg(〈A1, . . . , An〉) = max{wg(A1), . . . , wg(An)}+ 1; wg(✷A) = wg(A) + 2.
The height of a derivation is the greatest number of successive applications
of rules in it, where axioms have height 0. A property is height-preserving if the
height of derivations is an invariant.
Proposition 4.3. The following structural rules are height-preserving admis-
sible in H.E∗, where φ is any formula A or block 〈Σ〉. Moreover, all rules in
H.E∗ are height-preserving invertible.
G | Γ⇒ ∆
Lwk
G | Γ, φ⇒ ∆
G | Γ⇒ ∆
Rwk
G | Γ⇒ A,∆
G
Ewk
G | Γ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, φ, φ⇒ ∆
Lctr
G | Γ, φ⇒ ∆
G | Γ⇒ A,A,∆
Rctr
G | Γ⇒ A,∆
G | Γ⇒ ∆ | Γ⇒ ∆
Ectr
G | Γ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, 〈Θ, A,A〉 ⇒ ∆
Sctr
G | Γ, 〈Θ, A〉 ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, 〈Θ, A〉 ⇒ ∆
Smgl
G | Γ, 〈Θ, A,A〉 ⇒ ∆
Proof. For each rule R, we prove that if the premise is derivable with height at
most n, then the conclusion is also derivable with height at most n. The proof
is by induction on the height of the derivation of the premise, highlighting that
rules Lctr and Rctr are simultaneously proved admissible by mutual induction.
Moreover, admissibility of Sctr and Smgl rely on height-preserving admissibility
of contraction and weakening on formulae outside blocks, respectively.
We will illustrate with the following cases
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• Case Ectr + R✷m. Suppose that
π
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Σ⇒ B
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
R✷m
where the height of π is at most n. By induction hypothesis, there is a
proof π′, with height at most n, of G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Σ⇒ B. Hence
π′
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Σ⇒ B
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
R✷m
• Case Lctr + D2. Consider the derivation
π1
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | Σ,Σ⇒
πA,B2
{G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | ⇒ A,B}A,B∈Σ
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆
D2
where the heights of π1 and π
A,B
2 are at most n. Observe that, in par-
ticular, there are proofs πA,A2 of {G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | ⇒ A,A}A∈Σ. By
induction hypothesis, there are proofs π′1, π
A
2 , with height at most n, of
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | Σ ⇒ and {G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | ⇒ A}A∈Σ, respectively.
Hence
π1
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | Σ⇒
πA2
{G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ | ⇒ A}A∈Σ
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆
D1
Finally, note that since all rules are cumulative, height-preserving invertibil-
ity of all rules is an immediate consequence of height-preserving admissibility of
weakening. For instance, invertibility of rule R✷m is proved as follows
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
Ewk
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Σ⇒ B
We note that due to the fact that the R✷ rule isolates single formulae from
block in its right premiss, in the non-monotonic case the full-blown weakening
inside blocks is not admissible. However, the weaker rule of mingle inside blocks
Smgl is.
The proof of admissibility of cut is more intricate and deserves more atten-
tion. In the hypersequent framework, the cut rule is formulated as follows
G | Γ⇒ A,∆ G | Γ, A⇒ ∆
cut
G | Γ⇒ ∆
The admissibility of cut is proved simultaneously with the admissibility of the
following rule sub, which states that a formula A inside one or more blocks can
be replaced by any equivalent multiset of formulas Σ
G | Σ⇒ A {G | A⇒ B}B∈Σ G | Γ, 〈An1 ,Π1〉, . . . , 〈Ank ,Πk〉 ⇒ ∆
sub
G | Γ, 〈Σn1 ,Π1〉, . . . , 〈Σnk ,Πk〉 ⇒ ∆
19
where Ani (resp. Σni) is a compact way to denote ni occurrences of A (resp. Σ).
In the monotonic case we need to consider, instead of sub, the rule
G | Σ⇒ A G | Γ, 〈An1 ,Π1〉, . . . , 〈Ank ,Πk〉 ⇒ ∆
subM
G | Γ, 〈Σn1 ,Π1〉, . . . , 〈Σnk ,Πk〉 ⇒ ∆
Theorem 4.4. If H.E∗ is non-monotonic, then the rules cut and sub are ad-
missible in H.E∗; otherwise cut and subM are admissible in H.E
∗.
Proof. We prove that cut and sub are admissible in non-monotonic H.E∗; the
proof in the monotonic case is analogous. Recall that, for an application of cut,
the cut formula is the formula which is deleted by that application, while the cut
height is the sum of the heights of the derivations of the premisses of cut. The
theorem is a consequence of the following claims, where Cut(c, h) means that
all applications of cut of height h on a cut formula of weight c are admissible,
and Sub(c) means that all applications of sub where the principal formula A has
weight c are admissible (for any Σ,Π1, . . . ,Πk)
• (A) ∀c.Cut(c, 0).
• (B) ∀h.Cut(0, h).
• (C) ∀c.(∀h.Cut(c, h)→ Sub(c)).
• (D) ∀c.∀h.((∀c′ < c.(Sub(c′) ∧ ∀h′.Cut(c′, h′)) ∧ ∀h′′ < h.Cut(c, h′′)) →
Cut(c, h)).
(A) If the cut height is 0, then cut is applied to initial hypersequents G | Γ ⇒
A,∆ and G | Γ, A ⇒ ∆. We show that the conclusion of cut G | Γ ⇒ ∆ is
an inital hypersequent, whence it is derivable without cut. If G is an inital
hypersequent we are done. Otherwise Γ ⇒ A,∆ and Γ, A ⇒ ∆ are initial
sequents. For the first sequent there are three possibilities: (i) Γ ⇒ ∆ is an
initial sequent, or (ii) A = ⊤, or (iii) A = p and Γ = Γ′, p. If (ii), then the
second sequent is Γ,⊤ ⇒ ∆, which implies that Γ⇒ ∆ is an initial sequent. If
(iii), then the second sequent is Γ′, p, p⇒ ∆. Then Γ′ ⇒ ∆ is an initial sequent,
or ∆ = p,∆′, which implies that Γ′, p⇒ p,∆′ = Γ⇒ ∆ is an initial sequent.
(B) If the cut formula has weight 0, then it is ⊥, ⊤, or a propositional
variable p. For all three possibilities the proof is by complete induction on h.
The basic case h = 0 is a particular case of (A). For the inductive step, we
distinguish three cases.
(i) The cut formula ⊥, ⊤, or p is not principal in the last rule applied in the
derivation of the left premiss. By examining all possible rule applications, we
show that the application of cut can be replaced by one or more applications of
cut at a smaller height. For instance, assume that the last rule applied is L✷.
G | 〈A〉,✷A,Γ⇒ ∆,⊥
L✷
G | ✷A,Γ⇒ ∆,⊥ G | ⊥,✷A,Γ⇒ ∆
cut
G | ✷A,Γ⇒ ∆
The derivation is transformed as follows, with a height-preserving application
of Lwk and an application of cut of smaller height.
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G | 〈A〉,✷A,Γ⇒ ∆,⊥
G | ⊥,✷A,Γ⇒ ∆
Lwk
G | ⊥, 〈A〉,✷A,Γ⇒ ∆
cut
G | 〈A〉,✷A,Γ⇒ ∆
L✷
G | ✷A,Γ⇒ ∆
The situation is similar if the last rule in the derivation of the left premiss is
applied to some sequent in G.
(ii) The cut formula ⊥, ⊤, or p is not principal in the last rule applied in the
derivation of the right premiss. The case is analogous to (i). As an example,
suppose that the last rule applied is R✷m.
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B,⊥
G | ⊥, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B | Σ⇒ B
R✷m
G | ⊥, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B
cut
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B
The derivation is converted into
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B,⊥
Ewk
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B,⊥ | Σ⇒ B G | ⊥, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B | Σ⇒ B
cut
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B | Σ⇒ B
R✷m
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B
where cut is applied at a smaller height.
(iii) The cut formula ⊥, ⊤, or p is principal in the last rule applied in the
derivation of both premisses. Then the cut formula is p, as ⊥ (resp. ⊤) is never
principal on the right-hand side (resp. the left-hand side) of the conclusion of
any rule application. This means that both premisses are derived by init, which
implies that h = 0. Then we are back to case (A).
(C) Assume ∀hCut(c, h). We prove that all applications of sub where A
has weight c are admissible. The proof is by induction on the height m of
the derivation of G | 〈An1 ,Π1〉, . . . , 〈Ank ,Πk〉,Γ ⇒ ∆. If m = 0 or no block
among 〈A,Π1〉, . . . , 〈A,Πk〉 is principal in the last rule application, then the
proof proceeds similarly to previous cases. If m > 0 and at least one block
among 〈A,Π1〉, . . . , 〈A,Πk〉 is principal in the last rule application we have the
following possibilities.
• The last rule applied is R✷:
1©
G | 〈Ani ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷D | Ani ,Πi ⇒ D
{G | 〈Ani ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷D | D ⇒ C}C∈Πi
{G | 〈Ani ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷D | D ⇒ A}
ni
1
...
R✷
G | 〈Ani ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷D
The derivation is converted as follows. First we derive:
G | Σ⇒ A
Ewk
G | Σ⇒ A | Ani ,Πi ⇒ D
G | A⇒ B{
Ewk
}
B∈ΣG | A⇒ B | Ani ,Πi ⇒ D 1©
sub
G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷D | Ani ,Πi ⇒ D
21
(where rule sub possibly applies to further blocks inside Γ). Then by apply-
ing Ewk to G | Σ ⇒ A we obtain G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ ⇒ ∆,✷D | Σ ⇒ A. By
auxiliary applications of wk we can cut A and get G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ ⇒ ∆,✷D |
Σ, Ani−1,Πi ⇒ D. Then with further applications of cut (each time with aux-
iliary applications of wk) we obtain G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ ⇒ ∆,✷D | Σni ,Πi ⇒ D.
By doing the same with the other premisses of R✷ in the initial derivation
we obtain also {{G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ ⇒ ∆,✷D | D ⇒ B}B∈Σ}
n1
1 and {G |
〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ ⇒ ∆,✷D | D ⇒ C}C∈Πi. Finally by R✷ we derive the conclu-
sion of sub G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷D.
• The last rule applied is C:
G | 〈Ani ,Πi〉, 〈Anj ,Πj〉, 〈Ani , Anj ,Πi,Πj〉,Γ⇒ ∆
C
G | 〈Ani ,Πi〉, 〈Anj ,Πj〉,Γ⇒ ∆
By applying sub to the premiss we obtain
G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉, 〈Σnj ,Πj〉, 〈Σni ,Σnj ,Πi,Πj , 〉,Γ⇒ ∆, then by C we derive
G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉, 〈Σnj ,Πj〉,Γ⇒ ∆.
• The last rule applied is T:
G | Ani ,Πi, 〈Ani ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆
T
G | 〈Ani ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆
By applying the inductive hypothesis to the premiss we obtain
G | Ani ,Πi, 〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ ⇒ ∆. Then, from this and G | Σ ⇒ A, by several
applications of cut (each time with auxiliary applications of wk) we obtain G |
Σni ,Πi, 〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆. Finally, by T we derive G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆.
• The last rule applied is P:
G | 〈Ani ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆ | Ani ,Πi ⇒
P
G | 〈Ani ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆
By applying the inductive hypothesis to the premiss (after auxiliary applica-
tions of Ewk to the other premisses of sub) we obtain G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ ⇒ ∆ |
Ani ,Πi ⇒. Then, from this and G | Σ ⇒ A, by several applications of cut
(each time with auxiliary applications of wk) we obtain G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ ⇒ ∆ |
Σni ,Πi ⇒. Finally, by P we derive G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉,Γ⇒ ∆.
• The last rule applied is D2: Then G | 〈A
ni ,Πi〉, 〈A
nj ,Πj〉,Γ ⇒ ∆ has
been derived by the following premisses. G | 〈Ani ,Πi〉, 〈Anj ,Πj〉,Γ ⇒ ∆ |
Ani , Anj ,Πi,Πj ⇒; {G | 〈Ani ,Πi〉, 〈Anj ,Πj〉,Γ ⇒ ∆ |⇒ A,A}
ni+nj
1 ; {{G |
〈Ani ,Πi〉, 〈Anj ,Πj〉,Γ ⇒ ∆ |⇒ A,C}C∈Πi}
nj
1 ; {{G | 〈A
ni ,Πi〉, 〈Anj ,Πj〉,Γ ⇒
∆ |⇒ A,D}D∈Πj}
ni
1 ; and {G | 〈A
ni ,Πi〉, 〈Anj ,Πj〉,Γ⇒ ∆ |⇒ A,A}C∈Πi,D∈Πj .
We consider the other premisses of sub and apply cutmany times (each time with
auxiliary applications of wk) so to replace all occurrences of A with formulas in
Σ. As final step we can apply D2 and obtain G | 〈Σni ,Πi〉, 〈Σnj ,Πj〉,Γ⇒ ∆.
• The remaining cases D+n and D1 are similar to the previous ones.
(D) Assume ∀c′ < c. (Sub(c′)∧∀h′. Cut(c′, h′)) and ∀h′′ < h.Cut(c, h′′). We
show that all applications of cut of height h on a cut formula of weight c can
be replaced by different applications of cut, either of smaller height or on a cut
formula of smaller weight. We can assume h, c > 0 as the cases h = 0 and c = 0
have been already considered in (A) and (B). We distinguish two cases.
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(i) The cut formula is not principal in the last rule application in the deriva-
tion of at least one of the two premisses of cut. This case is analogous to (i) or
(ii) in (B).
(ii) The cut formula is principal in the last rule application in the derivation
of both premisses. Then the cut formula is either B ◦C, with ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→}, or
✷B.
• The case of boolean connective is standard. We consider as an example
B → C. We have:
1©
G | B,Γ⇒ ∆, B → C,C
R→
G | Γ⇒ ∆, B → C
2©
G | B → C,Γ⇒ ∆, B
3©
G | C,B → C,Γ⇒ ∆
L→
G | B → C,Γ⇒ ∆
cut
G | Γ⇒ ∆
The derivation is converted into the following one:
G | Γ⇒ ∆, B → C
Rwk
G | Γ⇒ ∆, B → C,B 2©
cut
G | Γ⇒ ∆, B
Rwk
G | Γ⇒ ∆, B, C
1©
G | B → C,Γ⇒ ∆
Lwk
G | B,B → C,Γ⇒ ∆
Rwk
G | B,B → C,Γ⇒ ∆, C
cut
G | B,Γ⇒ ∆, C
cut
G | Γ⇒ ∆, C
G | Γ⇒ ∆, B → C
Lwk
G | C,Γ⇒ ∆, B → C 3©
cut
G | C,Γ⇒ ∆
cut
G | Γ⇒ ∆
• If the cut formula is ✷B we have
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B | Σ⇒ B
... {G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B | B ⇒ C}C∈Σ
R✷
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B
G | 〈B〉,✷B, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆
L✷
G | ✷B, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆
cut
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆
The derivation is converted as follows, with several applications of cut of
smaller height and an admissible application of sub.
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B | Σ⇒ B
G | ✷B, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆
Ewk
G | ✷B, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆ | Σ⇒ B
cut
4© G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆ | Σ⇒ B
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B
Lwk
G | 〈B〉, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B G | 〈B〉,✷B, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆
cut
G | 〈B〉, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆
Ewk
5© G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆ | 〈B〉, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆
4©
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆,✷B | B ⇒ C
G | ✷B, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆
Ewk
G | ✷B, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆ | B ⇒ C{
cut
}
C∈ΣG | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆ | B ⇒ C 5©
sub
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆ | 〈Σ〉, 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆
Lctr
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆ | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆
Ectr
G | 〈Σ〉,Γ⇒ ∆
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Given the admissibility of the structural rules and cut we can prove that
the calculi are syntactically complete with respect to the corresponding axiom
systems.
Theorem 4.5 (Syntactic completeness). If ⊢E∗ A then ⇒ A is derivable in
H.E∗.
Proof. As usual, we have to show that all axioms of E∗ are derivable in H.E∗,
and that all rules of E∗ are admissible in H.E∗. The derivations of the modal
axioms and rules are displayed in Figure 5. For the derivations of the axioms
we implicitly consider Proposition 4.1. For the derivation of rule RE we assume
that A→ B and B → A are derivable in E∗, and for the derivation of rule RD+n
we assume that ¬(A1, . . . , An) is derivable in ED+n
∗
. Finally, MP is simulated
by cut in the usual way.
5 Complexity of proof search
One of the advantages of formal calculi is that they can often be used to es-
tablish complexity-optimal decision procedures for the corresponding logics via
backwards proof search. In this section we will use our hypersequent calculi
to do so. Before considering the results in detail, we note again that since all
the considered logics have standard sequent calculi, generic PSPACE complex-
ity results for all the logics follow standard backwards proof search using these
calculi. However, as established in [36], in many cases dropping the axiom C
lowers the complexity of the logic to coNP. Here we show how the hypersequent
calculi give rise to complexity optimal decision procedures for the logics without
C, before briefly commenting on the case where C is present.
Extensions without axiom C
The decision procedures for the logics without the axiom C implement back-
wards proof search on a polynomially bounded nondeterministic Turing machine
with universal choices to handle the branching caused by rules with several pre-
misses. Since all the rules are invertible, we can fix an order in which the rules
are applied. To prevent loops, we employ a local loop checking strategy, stating
that a rule is not applied (bottom-up) to a hypersequent G, if at least one of
its premisses is trivial in the sense that each of its components can be derived
from a component of the conclusion using only weakening and contraction. The
formal definition is as follows.
Definition 5.1. An application of a hypersequent rule with premissesH1, . . . , Hn
and conclusion G satisfies the local loop checking condition if for each premiss
Hi there exists a component Γ⇒ ∆ in Hi such that for no component Σ ⇒ Π
of the conclusion G we have: for all A ∈ Γ also A ∈ Σ; and for all 〈Θ〉 ∈ Γ there
is a 〈Ξ〉 ∈ Σ with set(Θ) = set(Ξ); and set(∆) ⊆ set(Π).
Since the rules are cumulative, every application of a rule satisfying the
local loop checking condition adds in each of its premisses at least one new
block or formula to an existing component, or adds a new component, which
is not subsumed by a component of the conclusion. The following proposition
shows that local loop checking does not jeopardise completeness.
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Algorithm 1: Decision procedure for the derivability problem in H.E∗
Input: A hypersequent G and the code of a logic L
Output: “yes” if G is derivable in H.L, a hypersequent if it is not.
1 if there is a component Γ⇒ ∆ in G with ⊥ ∈ Γ, or ⊤ ∈ ∆, or Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅
then
2 return “yes” and halt ;
3 else if there is an applicable rule then
4 pick the first applicable rule;
5 universally choose a premiss H of this rule application;
6 check recursively whether H is derivable, output the answer and halt;
7 else
8 return G and halt;
9 end
Proposition 5.1. If a hypersequent is derivable in H.E∗ with a derivation of
height n, then it is derivable using a derivation of height n in which every rule
application satisfies the local loop checking condition.
Proof. By induction on the height of the derivation. The zero-premiss rules
trivially satisfy the local loop checking condition. If the height of the derivation
is n+ 1, consider the bottom-most rule application. If it satisfies the local loop
checking condition, we apply the induction hypothesis to each of its premisses
and are done. Otherwise, there is a premiss such that for each of its components
Γ, 〈Θ1〉, . . . , 〈Θm〉 ⇒ ∆ (where Γ does not contain any block) there is a compo-
nent Σ⇒ Π of the conclusion G of the derivation with set(Γ) ⊆ set(Σ), and for
every i ≤ m there is a 〈Θ′i〉 ∈ Σ with set(Θi) = set(Θ
′
i), and set(∆) ⊆ set(Π).
Using height-preserving admissibility of the structural rules (Proposition 4.3)
we thus obtain a derivation of G of height n, and an appeal to the induction
hypothesis yields a derivation of height n where every rule application satisfies
the local loop checking condition.
Note that in the proof of this proposition, no new rule applications are
added to a derivation, and that the order of rule applications is preserved in the
proof of admissibility of the structural rules (Proposition 4.3). Hence given a
derivation of a hypersequent, we can first adjust the ordering of the rules using
invertibility, then remove all rule applications violating the local loop checking
condition. This yields completeness of proof search under these constraints:
Corollary 5.2. Proof search inH.E∗ with local loop checking and a fixed order
on the applications of rules is complete.
The proof search algorithm thus applies the rules backwards in an arbitrary
but fixed order, universally chooses one of their premisses and then recursively
checks that this premiss is derivable. The procedure is shown in Algorithm 1. In
order to facilitate the countermodel construction for underivable hypersequents
in the next section, we show termination for all considered logics, even those
containing axiom C:
Theorem 5.3. Algorithm 1 terminates for all logics H.E∗.
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Proof. Due to the subformula property of the rules, every formula occurring in
a hypersequent in a run of Algorithm 1 is a subformula of the input. Moreover,
local loop checking prevents the duplication of formulas, blocks and components.
Thus, every component occurring in a run of the algorithm contains a subset of
(occurrences of) subformulas of the input both on its antecedent and succedent,
together with a set of blocks, each containing a subset of (occurrences of) sub-
formulas of the input. Since there are only finitely many of these, the number
of possible components is finite, and hence also the number of hypersequents
occurring in a run of the algorithm. Since every rule application satisfying local
loop checking strictly increases the size of the hypersequent, each run of the
algorithm thus halts after finitely many steps.
For the logics without axiom C, a closer analysis of the run time yields the
optimal complexity bound:
Theorem 5.4. For the logics without C, Algorithm 1 runs in coNP, whence
for these logics the calculi provide a complexity-optimal decision procedure.
Proof. Since the procedure is in the form of a non-deterministic Turing machine
with universal choices, it suffices to show that every computation of this machine
has polynomial length. Every application of a rule adds either a subformula of its
conclusion or a new block to one of the components, or adds a new component.
Due to local loop checking it never adds a formula, block or component which
is already in the conclusion, so it suffices to calculate the maximal size of a
hypersequent occurring in proof search for G. Suppose that the size of G is
n. Then both the number of components in G and the number of subformulas
of G are bounded by n. Since the local loop check prevents the duplication of
formulas, each component contains at most n formulas in the antecedent and n
formulas in the succedent. Moreover, since we only consider logics without the
axiom C, every newly created block contains exactly one formula. Again, due
to the local loop checking condition no block is duplicated, so every component
contains at most n blocks. Thus every component has size at most 3n. The
procedure creates new components from a block and a formula of an already
existing component using one of the rules R✷ and R✷m, or from ℓ components
using one of the rules P, D2, D1, D
+
ℓ , with ℓ ≤ k for a fixed k depending on
the logic. Hence there are at most n2+ k ·nk many different components which
can be created without violating the local loop checking condition. Thus every
hypersequent occurring in the proof contains at most n + n2 + k · nk many
components, each of size at most 3n, giving a total size and thus running time
of O(n3), resp. O(nk+1) for k > 2.
As noted above, Algorithm 1 works properly also for logics with the axiom
C, ensuring in particular termination. However, hypersequents occurring in a
proof of H can be exponentially large with respect to the size of H . This is due
to the presence of the rule C that, given n formulas ✷A1, . . . , ✷An, allows one
to build a block for every subset of {A1, . . . , An}. In this respect, this decision
procedure does not match the PSPACE complexity upper bound established for
these systems by Vardi [36]. However, this is not really unexpected, since one of
the main appeals of the hypersequent calculi is that they can be used to directly
construct countermodels for unprovable hypersequents, and in some logics with
C it is possible to force exponentially large countermodels, in particular in
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normal modal logic K [3]. Hence for these logics the hypersequents will need
to be of exponential size, suggesting that we need to modify the hypersequent
calculi to obtain complexity-optimal decision procedures.
Logics with axiom C
In order to obtain a PSPACE decision procedure for logics with axiom C we
must adopt a different strategy. Since already the standard sequent calculi
could be used to obtain complexity-optimal decision procedures in a standard
way, we only sketch the ideas. Instead of the rules in Figure 4, we consider
their unkleene’d – and non-invertible – version, i.e. the ones with all principal
formulas and structures deleted from the premisses. For instance R✷m, R✷ and
C are replaced respectively with
G | Γ⇒ ∆ |Σ⇒ B
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
G | Γ⇒ ∆ | Σ⇒ B {G | Γ⇒ ∆ | B ⇒ A}A∈Σ
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
G | Γ, 〈Σ,Π〉 ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆
Call the resulting calculus H.E∗−. Backwards proof search is then implemented
on an alternating Turing machine by existentially guessing the last applied rule
except for N, and universally checking that all of its premisses are derivable. To
ensure that N is applied if it is present in the system, we stipulate that it is ap-
plied once to every component of the input, and that if the existentially guessed
rule creates a new component, the rule N is applied immediately afterwards to
each of its premisses. Since no rule application keeps the principal formulas in
the premisses, and since the rule N if present is applied exactly once to every
component, there is no need for any loop checking condition.
The calculi H.E∗− are sound and complete. Soundness is obvious, since we
can add the missing formulas and structures and recover derivations in H.E∗.
Completeness is seen easiest by simulating the standard sequent calculi, e.g. [21].
We can show that the calculi H.E∗− give a PSPACE upper bound.
Theorem 5.5. Backwards proof search in H.E∗− is in PSPACE.
Proof. We need to show that every run of the procedure terminates in polyno-
mial time. Assume that the size of the input is n. Let the weight of a component
in a hypersequent be the sum of the weights of the formulas and blocks occur-
ring in it according to Definition 4.3, and suppose that the maximal weight
of components in the input is w. Then every rule apart from N decreases the
weight of the component active in its conclusion. Moreover, a new component
is only introduced in place of at least one subformula of the input, hence any
hypersequent occurring in the proof search has at most n+n components. The
weight of each of these components is at most the maximal weight of a compo-
nent of the input (plus one in the cases with N). Since the rule N is applied at
most once to each component, it is thus applied at most n times in the total
proof search. Thus the runtime in total is O(n2 · w), hence polynomial in the
size of the input. Thus the procedure runs in alternating polynomial time, and
thus in PSPACE.
Thus, the situation of logics with axiom C can be summarised as follows. On
the one hand, we have a fully invertible calculus H.EC∗ which is terminating
but not optimal. As we shall see in the next section, this calculus allows for
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direct extraction of countermodels from single failed proofs. On the other hand,
we have a calculus H.EC∗− which is optimal but not invertible, whence direct
extraction of countermodels from single failed proofs is not possible. As for
many other logics, this illustrates the existence of a necessary trade-off between
the optimal complexity of the calculus and the direct countermodel extraction.
6 Countermodel extraction and semantic com-
pleteness
We now prove semantic completeness of the hypersequent calculi, i.e. every valid
hypersequent is derivable. This amounts to showing that a non-provable hyper-
sequent has a countermodel. Countermodels are found in the bi-neighbourhood
semantics, as it is better suited for direct countermodel extraction from failed
proofs than the standard semantics. The reason is that, in order to define a
standard neighbourhood model, we need to determine exactly the truth sets of
formulas: If we want a world w to force ✷A, then we have to make sure that
JAK belongs to N (w), thus JAK must be computed. But this need conflicts with
the fact that failed proofs only provide partial information. Intuitively, coun-
termodel extraction from a saturated hypersequent in a proof of H is based on
the natural semantic reading according to which every component corresponds
to a world in the model, and every formula in the antecedent (respectively in
the succedent) of a component is true (respectively false) in the corresponding
world. But, unless one resorts to a form of the analytic cut rule as implicitly
done in [21], it is hardly ever the case that every subformula of H is either in
the antecedent or in the succedent of every component, thus the failed proof
does not suffice to exactly determine the truth set of every subformula. On the
contrary, in order for a world w to force ✷A in a bi-neighbourhood model it
suffices to find a suited pair (α, β) such that α ⊆ JAK ⊆ W \ β. As we shall
see, such a pair can be extracted direclty from the failed proof even without
knowing exactly the extension of JAK.
In order to prove semantic completeness we make use of the backwards proof
search strategy based on local loop checking already considered in Section 5 (Al-
gorithm 1). This strategy amounts to considering the following notion of satu-
ration, stating that no bottom-up rule application is allowed to initial sequents,
and that a bottom-up application of a rule R is not allowed to a hypersequent
G if G already fulfills the corresponding saturation condition (R).
Definition 6.1 (Saturated hypersequent). Let H = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 | . . . | Γn ⇒
∆n be a hypersequent occurring in a proof for H
′. The saturation conditions
associated to each application of a rule ofH.E∗ are as follows: (init) Γi∩∆i = ∅.
(L⊥) ⊥ /∈ Γi. (R⊤) ⊤ /∈ ∆i. (L→) If A → B ∈ Γi, then A ∈ ∆i or B ∈ Γi.
(R→) If A → B ∈ ∆i, then A ∈ Γi and B ∈ ∆i. (L∧) If A ∧ B ∈ Γi, then
A ∈ Γi and B ∈ Γi. (R∧) If A ∧ B ∈ ∆i, then A ∈ ∆i or B ∈ ∆i. (L✷)
If ✷A ∈ Γi, then 〈A〉 ∈ Γi. (R✷) If 〈Σ〉,Γ ⇒ ∆,✷B is in H , then there is
Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, B in H such that set(Σ) ⊆ Γ′, or there is B,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, A in H for some
A ∈ Σ. (R✷m) If 〈Σ〉,Γ ⇒ ∆,✷B is in H , then there is Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, B in H such
that set(Σ) ⊆ Γ′. (N) 〈⊤〉 ∈ Γi. (C) If 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ∈ Γi, then there is 〈Ω〉 ∈ Γi such
that set(Σ,Π) = set(Ω). (T) If 〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn, then set(Σ) ⊆ Γn. (P) If Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ is
in H , then there is Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ in H such that set(Σ) ⊆ Γ′. (D1) If Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ∆ is in
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H , then there is Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ in H such that set(Σ) ⊆ Γ′, or there is Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, A in
H for some A ∈ Σ. (D2) If Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆ is in H , then there is Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ in H
such that set(Σ,Π) ⊆ Γ′, or there is Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, A,B in H for some A ∈ Σ, B ∈ Π.
(D+n ) If Γ, 〈Σ1〉, . . . , 〈Σn〉 ⇒ ∆ is in H , then there is Γ
′ ⇒ ∆′ in H such that
set(Σ1, . . . ,Σn) ⊆ Γ′.
We say that H is saturated with respect to an application of a rule R if it
satisfies the saturation condition (R) for that particular rule application, and
that it is saturated with respect to H.E∗ if it is saturated with respect to all
possible applications of any rule of H.E∗.
Proposition 6.1. If Algorithm 1 with input G returns a hypersequent H , then
H is saturated and, for every component Γ ⇒ ∆ of G, there is a component
Σ⇒ Π of H with set(Γ) ⊆ set(Σ) and set(∆) ⊆ set(Π).
Proof. Saturation of H follows from verifying that if one of the saturation con-
ditions is not met, the corresponding rule can be applied without violating the
local loop checking condition. Since Algorithm 1 applies all possible rules satis-
fying the local loop checking condition before halting and returning a hyperse-
quent, H must be saturated. The second statement follows from the cumulative
nature of the rules.
Then, given a saturated hypersequent H we can directly construct a coun-
termodel for H in the bi-neighbourhood semantics in the following way.
Definition 6.2 (Countermodel construction). Let H be a saturated hyperse-
quent occurring in a proof for H ′. Moreover, let e : N −→ H be an enumeration
of the components of H . Given e, we can write H as Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 | . . . | Γk ⇒ ∆k.
We call k the length of H . The model M = 〈W ,N ,V〉 is defined as follows:
• W = {n | Γn ⇒ ∆n ∈ H}.
• V(p) = {n | p ∈ Γn}.
• For all blocks 〈Σ〉 appearing in a component Γm ⇒ ∆m of H , Σ+ = {n |
set(Σ) ⊆ Γn} and Σ− = {n | Σ ∩∆n 6= ∅}.
• The definition of N depends whether the calculus is or not monotonic:
– Non-monotonic case: N (n) = {(Σ+,Σ−) | 〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn}.
– Monotonic case: N (n) = {(Σ+, ∅) | 〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn}.
Lemma 6.2. Let H = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 | . . . | Γk ⇒ ∆k be a saturated hypersequent,
and M be the model defined on the basis of H as in Definition 6.2. Then for
every A, 〈Σ〉 and every n ∈ W , we have:
• if A ∈ Γn, then M, n  A;
• if 〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn, then M, n  ✷
∧
Σ; and
• if A ∈ ∆n, then M, n 6 A.
Moreover, if the proof is in calculus H.EX∗, then M is a X-model.
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Proof. The first claim is proved by mutual induction on A and 〈Σ〉.
(p ∈ Γn) By definition, n ∈ V(p). Thus n  p.
(p ∈ ∆n) By saturation of init, p /∈ Γn. Then n /∈ V(p), thus n 6 p.
(B ∧ C ∈ Γn) By saturation of L∧, B ∈ Γn and C ∈ Γn. Then by inductive
hypothesis, n  B and n  C, thus n  B ∧ C.
(B ∧ C ∈ ∆n) By saturation of R∧, B ∈ ∆n or C ∈ ∆n. Then by inductive
hypothesis, n 6 B or n 6 C, thus n 6 B ∧C.
For A = B ∨ C,B → C, the proof is similar to the previous cases.
(〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn) In the non-monotonic case we have: By definition (Σ+,Σ−) ∈
N (n). We show that Σ+ ⊆ J
∧
ΣK and Σ− ⊆ J¬
∧
ΣK, which implies n  ✷
∧
Σ.
If m ∈ Σ+, then set(Σ) ⊆ Γm. By i.h. m  A for all A ∈ Σ, then m 
∧
Σ.
If m ∈ Σ−, then there is B ∈ Σ ∩∆m. By i.h. m 6 B, then m 6
∧
Σ. In the
monotonic case the proof is analogous.
(✷B ∈ Γn) By saturation of L✷, 〈B〉 ∈ Γn. Then by i.h. n  ✷B.
(✷B ∈ ∆n) In the non-monotonic case, assume (α, β) ∈ N (n). Then there
is 〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn such that Σ+ = α and Σ− = β. By saturation of rule R✷, there
is m ∈ W such that Σ ⊆ Γm and B ∈ ∆m, or there is m ∈ W such that
Σ ∩ ∆m 6= ∅ and B ∈ Γm. In the first case, m ∈ Σ+ = α and by inductive
hypothesis m 6 B, thus α 6⊆ JBK. In the second case, m ∈ Σ− = β and by
inductive hypothesis m  B, thus β ∩ JBK 6= ∅, i.e. JBK 6⊆ W \ β. Therefore
n 6 ✷B. The monotonic case is analogous.
Now we prove that if the failed proof is in H.EX∗, then M satisfies condi-
tion (X).
(M) By definition, β = ∅ for every (α, β) ∈ N (n).
(N) By saturation of rule N, 〈⊤〉 ∈ Γn for all n ∈ W , thus (⊤+,⊤−) ∈ N (n).
Moreover, by saturation of R⊤, ⊤− = ∅.
(C) Assume that (α, β), (γ, δ) ∈ N (n). Then there are 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ∈ Γn such
that Σ+ = α, Σ− = β, Π+ = γ and Π− = δ. By saturation or rule C, there is
〈Ω〉 ∈ Γn such that set(Ω) = set(Σ,Π), thus (Ω+,Ω−) ∈ N (n). We show that
(i) Ω+ = α ∩ γ and (ii) Ω− = β ∪ δ. (i) m ∈ Ω+ iff set(Ω) = set(Σ,Π) ⊆ Γm iff
set(Σ) ⊆ Γm and set(Π) ⊆ Γm iff m ∈ Σ+ = α and m ∈ Π+ = γ iff m ∈ α ∩ γ.
(ii) m ∈ Ω− iff Ω∩∆m 6= ∅ iff Σ,Π∩∆m 6= ∅ iff Σ∩∆m 6= ∅ or Π ∩∆m 6= ∅ iff
m ∈ Σ− = β or m ∈ Π− = δ iff m ∈ β ∪ δ.
(T) If (α, β) ∈ N (n), then there is 〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn such that Σ+ = α and Σ− = β.
By saturation of rule T, set(Σ) ⊆ Γn, then n ∈ Σ+ = α.
(P) If (α, β) ∈ N (n), then there is 〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn such that Σ+ = α and Σ− = β.
By saturation of rule P, there is m ∈ W such that set(Σ) ⊆ Γm, then m ∈ Σ+ =
α, that is α 6= ∅.
(D) Assume (α, β), (γ, δ) ∈ N (n). If (α, β) 6= (γ, δ), then there are 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ∈
Γn such that Σ
+ = α,Σ− = β,Π+ = γ and Π− = δ. If the calculus is non-
monotonic, then by saturation of rule D2 there is m ∈ W such that set(Σ,Π) ⊆
Γm or there is m ∈ W such that A,B ∈ ∆m for A ∈ Σ and B ∈ Π. In the
first case, set(Σ) ⊆ Γm and set(Π) ⊆ Γm, thus m ∈ Σ+ = α and m ∈ Π+ = γ,
that is α ∩ γ 6= ∅. In the second case, m ∈ Σ− = β and m ∈ Π− = δ, that is
β ∩ δ 6= ∅. If in contrast the calculus is monotonic, by saturation of DM there
is m ∈ W such that set(Σ,Π) ⊆ Γm. Then set(Σ) ⊆ Γm and set(Π) ⊆ Γm, thus
m ∈ Σ+ = α and m ∈ Π+ = γ, that is α ∩ γ 6= ∅. The other possibility is that
(α, β) 6= (γ, δ). Then there is 〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn such that Σ+ = α and Σ− = β. In the
non-monotonic case, by saturation of D1 there is m ∈ W such that set(Σ) ⊆ Γm
or there is m ∈ W such that A ∈ ∆m for some A ∈ Σ. Then m ∈ Σ+ = α,
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that is α 6= ∅, or m ∈= Σ− = β, that is β 6= ∅. In the monotonic case we can
consider saturation of P and conclude that Σ+ = α 6= ∅.
(RD+n ) Assume (α1, β1), . . . , (αm, βm) be any m ≤ n different bi-neigh-
bourhood pairs belonging to N (n). Then there are 〈Σ1〉, . . . , 〈Σm〉 ∈ Γn such
that Σ+i = αi and Σ
−
i = βi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m. By saturation of rule
D+m (that by definition belongs to the calculus H.ED
+
n
∗
), there is ℓ ∈ W such
that set(Σ1, . . . ,Σm) ⊆ Γℓ. Then ℓ ∈ Σ
+
1 = α1, . . . , ℓ ∈ Σ
+
m = αm, that is
α1 ∩ . . . ∩ αm 6= ∅.
Observe that, since all rules are cumulative, M is also a countermodel of
the root hypersequent H ′. Moreover, since every proof built in accordance with
the strategy either provides a derivation of the root hypersequent or contains a
saturated hypersequent, this allows us to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3 (Semantic completeness). If H is valid in all bi-neighbourhood
models for E∗, then it is derivable in H.E∗.
Proof. Assume H not derivable in H.E∗. Then there is a failed proof of H
in H.E∗ containing some saturated hypersequent H ′. By Lemma 6.2, we can
construct a bi-neighbourhood countermodel of H ′, whence a countermodel of
H , that satisfies all properties of bi-neighbourhood models for E∗. Therefore H
is not valid in every bi-neighbourhood model for E∗.
Since the countermodels constructed for underivable hypersequents are based
on the saturated hypersequents returned by Algorithm 1, and since the latter
are finite, we immediately obtain the finite model property for all the logics.
For the logics without C we can further bound the size of the models, defined
in the following way.
Definition 6.3. The size of a bi-neighbourhood or standard model M =
〈W ,N ,V〉 is defined as size(M) := |W|+
∑
w∈W |N (w)|.
Corollary 6.4. The logics without C have the polysize model property wrt.
bi-neighbourhood models, i.e., there is a polynomial p such that if a formula A
of size n is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a bi-neighbourhood model of size
at most p(n).
Proof. Given a underivable formula of size n, from the proof of Thm.5.4 we
obtain that the saturated hypersequent used for constructing the countermodel
hasO(nk) many components, each containingO(n) many blocks for k depending
only on the logic. Since the worlds of the countermodel correspond to the
components, and the neighbourhoods for each world are constructed from the
blocks occurring in that component, this model has at most O(nk) many worlds,
each with a neighbourhood of size at most O(n). Hence the size of the model
is O(nk+1).
As the above construction shows, we can directly extract a bi-neighbourhood
countermodel from any failed proof. If we want to obtain a countermodel in
the standard semantics we then need to apply the transformations presented
in Section 3. In principle, the rough transformation (Proposition 3.4) can be
embedded into the countermodel construction in order to directly construct a
neighbourhood model, we just need to modify the definition of N (n) in Defini-
tion 6.2 as follows:
31
N (n) = {γ | there is 〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn such that Σ+ ⊆ γ ⊆ W \ Σ−}.
However, in this way we might obtain a model with a larger neighbourhood
function than needed. In contrast, there is no obvious way to integrate the finer
transformation of Proposition 3.5 into the countermodel construction, since it
relies on the evaluation of formulas in an already existing model. But it does
lead to smaller models:
Corollary 6.5. The logics without C have the polysize model property wrt.
standard models.
Proof. Given a satisfiable formula of size n, from Corollary 6.4 we obtain a
bi-neighbourhood model with O(n) worlds. Since the transformation of Propo-
sition 3.5 constructs neighbourhoods from sets of truth sets of subformulas of
the input, the size of Nst(w) is at most n for each world w. Hence the total size
of the standard model is polynomial in the size n of the formula.
An alternative way of obtaining countermodels in the standard neighbour-
hood semantics is proposed in [21]. It basically consists in forcing the proof
search procedure to determine exactly the truth set of each formula. To this
aim, whenever a sequent representing a new world is created, the sequent is
saturated with respect to all disjunctions A ∨ ¬A such that A is a subformula
of the root sequent. This solution is equivalent to using analytic cut and makes
the proof search procedure significantly more complex than the one given here.
Below we show some examples of countermodel extraction from failed proofs,
both in the bi-neighbourhood and in the standard neighbourhood semantics.
The latter are obtained by applying the transformation in Proposition 3.5.
Example 6.1 (Proof search for axiom M in H.E and countermodels). The
following is a failed proof of ✷(p ∧ q)⇒ ✷p in H.E.
derivable
〈p ∧ q〉,✷(p ∧ q)⇒ ✷p | p ∧ q ⇒ p
derivable
. . . | p⇒ p ∧ q, p
saturated
〈p ∧ q〉,✷(p ∧ q)⇒ ✷p | p⇒ p ∧ q, q
R∧
〈p ∧ q〉,✷(p ∧ q)⇒ ✷p | p⇒ p ∧ q
R✷
〈p ∧ q〉,✷(p ∧ q)⇒ ✷p
L✷
✷(p ∧ q)⇒ ✷p
Bi-neighbourhood countermodel. Let us consider the following enumeration of
the compontents of the saturated hypersequent H : 1 7→ 〈p∧ q〉,✷(p ∧ q)⇒ ✷p;
and 2 7→ p⇒ p∧q, q. According to the construction in Definition 6.2, fromH we
obtain the following countermodel Mbi = 〈W ,Nbi,V〉: W = {1, 2}. V(p) = {2}
and V(q) = ∅. Nbi(2) = ∅ and Nbi(1) = {(∅, {2})}, as Nbi(1) = {(p∧q+, p∧q−)}
and p ∧ q+ = ∅, p ∧ q− = {2}. We have 1  ✷(p ∧ q) because ∅ ⊆ Jp ∧ qK = ∅ ⊆
W \ {2}, and 1 6 ✷p because JpK = {2} 6⊆ W \ {2}. Then 1 6 ✷(p ∧ q)→ ✷p.
Neighbourhood countermodel. We consider the set S = {✷(p ∧ q)→ ✷p,✷(p ∧
q),✷p, p ∧ q, p, q} of the subformulas of ✷(p ∧ q)→ ✷p. By applying the trans-
formation in Proposition 3.5 to the bi-neighbourhood model Mbi, we obtain
the standard model Mst = 〈W ,Nst,V〉, where W and V are as in Mbi, and
Nst(1) = {∅}, since Nst(1) = {Jp ∧ qKMbi} and Jp ∧ qKMbi = ∅.
Example 6.2 (Proof search for axiom K in H.EC and countermodels). If
Figure 6 we find a failed proof of ✷(p → q) → (✷p → ✷q) in H.EC. The
countermodels are as follows.
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Bi-neighbourhood countermodel. We consider the following enumeration of the
compontents of the saturated hypersequent H :
1 7→ ✷(p→ q),✷p, 〈p→ q〉, 〈p〉, 〈p→ q, p〉 ⇒ ✷q.
2 7→ q ⇒ p.
3 7→ p→ q ⇒ q, p.
According to the construction in Definition 6.2, from H we obtain the follow-
ing countermodel Mbi = 〈W ,Nbi,V〉: W = {1, 2, 3}. V(p) = ∅ and V(q) =
{2}. Nbi(2) = Nbi(3) = ∅, and Nbi(1) = {(∅, {2, 3}), ({3}, ∅)}, as Nbi(1) =
{(p+, p−), (p → q+, p → q−), (p, p → q+, p, p → q−)} and p+ = ∅, p− = {2, 3},
p→ q+ = {3}, p→ q− = ∅, p, p→ q+ = ∅, p, p→ q− = {2, 3}.
Then we have 1  ✷(p → q) because {3} ⊆ Jp → qK = W ⊆ W \ ∅; and
x  ✷p because ∅ ⊆ JpK = ∅ ⊆ W \ {2, 3}; but x 6 ✷q because {3} 6⊆ JqK = {2}
and JqK = {2} 6⊆ W \ {2, 3}, whence x 6 ✷(p→ q)→ (✷p→ ✷q). Observe that
Mbi is a C-model since (∅ ∩ {3}, {2, 3} ∪ ∅) = (∅, {2, 3}).
Neighbourhood countermodel. By logical equivalence we can restrict the consid-
ered set of formulas S to {✷(p→ q),✷p,✷q, p→ q, p, q,✷((p→ q)∧q),✷(p∧q)}.
By the transformation in Proposition 3.5, from Mbi we obtain the standard
model Mst = 〈W ,Nst,V〉, where W and V are as in Mbi, and Nst(1) = {Jp→
qKMbi , JpKMbi , Jp ∧ qKMbi} = {W , ∅}.
Finally, the next example shows the need of rule D1 for the calculus H.ED
and its non-monotonic extensions from the point of view of the countermodel
extraction.
Example 6.3 (Proof search for ¬✷⊤ in H.ED and countermodel). Let us
consider the following failed proof of ✷⊤ ⇒ in H.ED.
saturated
✷⊤, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ | ⊤ ⇒
R⊤
✷⊤, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ |⇒ ⊤
D1
✷⊤, 〈⊤〉 ⇒
L✷
✷⊤ ⇒
Consider the saturated hypersequent and establish 1 7→ ✷⊤, 〈⊤〉 ⇒, and 2 7→
⊤ ⇒. We obtain the bi-neighbourhood countermodel M = 〈W ,N ,V〉, where
W = {1, 2}; N (1) = {(⊤+,⊤−)} = {({2}, ∅)}; and N (2) = ∅. This is a D-model
and falsifies ¬✷⊤, as 1  ✷⊤.
Now imagine that the rule D1 does not belong to the calculus H.ED. In
this case the proof would end with ✷⊤, 〈⊤〉 ⇒, as no other rule is backwards
applicable to it. From this we would get the model M′ = 〈W ′,N ′,V ′〉, where
W ′ = {1} and N ′(1) = {(∅, ∅)}, which falsifies ¬✷⊤ but is not a D-model.
Relational countermodels for regular logics
We now show that from failed proofs inH.MC∗ it is also possible to directly ex-
tract relational countermodels of the non-derivable formulas (cf. Definition 3.4).
This possibility not only makes the extraction of the relational models more ef-
ficient (as it prevents to go through the transformation of a previously extracted
bi-neighbourhood model), but also shows the independency of the calculus from
any specific semantic choice. Relational models are extracted from failed proofs
in H.MC∗ as follows.
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derivable
. . . | p→ q, q ⇒ q derivable
. . . | q ⇒ p→ qsaturated
✷(p→ q),✷p, 〈p→ q〉, 〈p〉, 〈p→ q, p〉 ⇒ ✷q | q ⇒ p | p→ q ⇒ q, p
L→
✷(p→ q),✷p, 〈p→ q〉, 〈p〉, 〈p→ q, p〉 ⇒ ✷q | q ⇒ p | p→ q ⇒ q
R✷
✷(p→ q),✷p, 〈p→ q〉, 〈p〉, 〈p→ q, p〉 ⇒ ✷q | q ⇒ p
derivable
. . . | p→ q, p⇒ q
derivable
. . . | q ⇒ p→ q
R✷
✷(p→ q),✷p, 〈p→ q〉, 〈p〉, 〈p→ q, p〉 ⇒ ✷q
C
✷(p→ q),✷p, 〈p→ q〉, 〈p〉 ⇒ ✷q
L✷
✷(p→ q),✷p, 〈p→ q〉 ⇒ ✷q
L✷
✷(p→ q),✷p⇒ ✷q
Figure 6: Failed proof of axiom K in H.EC.
Definition 6.4 (Relational countermodel). Let H = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 | . . . | Γk ⇒ ∆k
be a saturated hypersequent occurring in a proof for H ′ in H.MC∗. For every
1 ≤ n ≤ k, we say that a block 〈Σ〉 is maximal for n if 〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn, and for every
〈Π〉 ∈ Γn, set(Π) ⊆ set(Σ). It is easy to see that by saturation of rule C every
component either contains a maximal block or does not contain any block at
all. On the basis of H we define the relational model M = 〈W ,W i,R,V〉, as
follows.
• W , V , and for every block 〈Σ〉, Σ+, are defined as in Definition 6.2.
• W i is the set of worlds n such that Γn does not contain any block.
• For every n ∈ W \W i, R(n) = Σ+, where 〈Σ〉 is a maximal block for n.
Observe that if 〈Σ〉 and 〈Π〉 are two maximal blocks for n, then Σ+ = Π+,
whence R(n) is unique for every n.
Lemma 6.6. Let H = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 | . . . | Γk ⇒ ∆k be a saturated hypersequent
occurring in a proof for H ′ inH.MC∗, andM be the model defined on the basis
of H as in Definition 6.4. Then for every formula A and block 〈Σ〉 we have: if
A ∈ Γn, then M, n  A; if 〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn, then M, n  ✷
∧
Σ; and if A ∈ ∆n, then
M, n 6 A. Moreover,M is a relational model forMC, and if H.MC∗ contains
rule N, then M is a standard Kripke model for normal modal logic K.
Proof. The truth lemma is proved by mutual induction on A and 〈Σ〉. As usual
we only consider modal formulas and blocks.
(〈Σ〉 ∈ Γn) Then n ∈ W \W i. Moreover, given a block 〈Π〉 maximal for n,
set(Σ) ⊆ set(Π). We show that R(n) = Π+ ⊆ J
∧
ΣK, which implies n  ✷
∧
Σ.
If m ∈ Π+, then set(Π) ⊆ Γm, then for all A ∈ Π, A ∈ Γm, and by inductive
hypothesis, m  A. Thus for all A ∈ Σ, m  A, that is m 
∧
Σ.
(A ∈ Γn) By saturation of L✷, 〈A〉 ∈ Γn. Then by inductive hypothesis,
n  ✷A.
(A ∈ ∆n) If there is no block in Γn, then n ∈ W
i, and by definition n 6 ✷A.
Otherwise, let 〈Σ〉 be a maximal block for n. Then by saturation of rule R✷m
there is m ∈ W such that set(Σ) ⊆ Γm and A ∈ ∆m. Thus m ∈ Σ+ = R(n),
and by inductive hypothesis, m 6 A, therefore R(n) 6⊆ JAK, which implies
n 6 ✷A.
34
As examples, we show failed proofs of axiom 4 in H.MC and H.MCN and
the extracted countermodels.
Example 6.4 (Proof search for axiom 4 inH.MC and countermodels). A failed
proof of 4 in H.MC is as follows.
saturated
✷p, 〈p〉 ⇒ ✷✷p | p⇒ ✷p
R✷m
✷p, 〈p〉 ⇒ ✷✷p
L✷✷p⇒ ✷✷p
Let: 1 7→ ✷p, 〈p〉 ⇒ ✷✷p; and 2 7→ p⇒ ✷p.
Bi-neighbourhood countermodel. From Definition 6.2 we obtain the following
model Mbi = 〈W ,N ,V〉: W = {1, 2}. V(p) = {2}. N (1) = {(p+, p−)} =
{({2}, ∅)}, and N (2) = ∅. We have {2} ⊆ JpK = {2} ⊆ W \ ∅, then 1  ✷p, but
{2} 6⊆ J✷pK = {1}, then 1 6 ✷✷p.
Relational countermodel. From Definition 6.4 we obtain the following model
Mr = 〈W ,W
i,R,V〉: W = {1, 2} and W i = {2}. V(p) = {2}. R(1) = p+ =
{2}. Since 2  p we have 1  ✷p. Moreover, since 2 ∈ W i, by definition 2 6 ✷p,
then 1 6 ✷✷p.
Example 6.5 (Proof search for axiom 4 in H.MCNT and countermodels). A
failed proof of 4 in H.MCNT is as follows.
saturated
✷p, 〈p〉, 〈⊤〉, 〈p,⊤〉, p,⊤ ⇒ ✷✷p | p,⊤, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ✷p | ⊤, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ p
N
✷p, 〈p〉, 〈⊤〉, 〈p,⊤〉, p,⊤ ⇒ ✷✷p | p,⊤, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ✷p | ⊤ ⇒ p
R✷m
✷p, 〈p〉, 〈⊤〉, 〈p,⊤〉, p,⊤ ⇒ ✷✷p | p,⊤, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ✷p
N
✷p, 〈p〉, 〈⊤〉, 〈p,⊤〉, p,⊤ ⇒ ✷✷p | p,⊤ ⇒ ✷p
R✷m
✷p, 〈p〉, 〈⊤〉, 〈p,⊤〉, p,⊤ ⇒ ✷✷p
T
✷p, 〈p〉, 〈⊤〉, 〈p,⊤〉 ⇒ ✷✷p
C
✷p, 〈p〉, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ✷✷p
N
✷p, 〈p〉 ⇒ ✷✷p
L✷
✷p⇒ ✷✷p
Let: 1 7→ ✷p, 〈p〉, 〈⊤〉, 〈p,⊤〉, p,⊤ ⇒ ✷✷p; 2 7→ p,⊤, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ✷p; and 3 7→
⊤, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ p.
Bi-neighbourhood countermodel. From Definition 6.2 we obtain the following
model Mbi = 〈W ,N ,V〉: W = {1, 2, 3}. V(p) = {1, 2}.
N (1) = {(p+, p−), (⊤+,⊤−), (p,⊤+; p,⊤−)} = {({1, 2}, {3}), ({1, 2, 3}, ∅)}.
N (2) = N (3) = {(⊤+,⊤−)} = {({1, 2, 3}, ∅)}. It is easy to see that Mbi is a
MCNT-model. Moreover, 1  ✷p and 1 6 ✷✷p, then 1 6 ✷p→ ✷✷p.
Relational countermodel. From Definition 6.4 we obtain the following model
Mr = 〈W ,W i,R,V〉: W = {1, 2, 3} and W i = ∅. V(p) = {1, 2}. R(1) =
(p,⊤)+ = {1, 2}; and R(2) = R(3) = ⊤+ = {1, 2, 3}. Since 1  p and 2  p,
1  ✷p. But 3 6 p, then 2 6 ✷p, thus 1 6 ✷✷p. Then we have 1 6 ✷p→ ✷✷p.
Notice that R is reflexive but is not transitive, as 1R2, 2R3, but not 1R3.
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7 On translations for the classical cube
Different proof-theoretical frameworks can be used for specifying axiomatic sys-
tems, and there are many possible reasons for preferring one over the other.
The best known (and maybe simplest) formalism for analytic proof systems is
Gentzen’s sequent calculus [11]. But simplicity often implies less comprehen-
siveness, and here it is not different: although being an ideal tool for proving
meta-logical properties, sequent calculus is not expressive enough for construct-
ing analytic calculi for many logics of interest. Moreover, sequent rules seldom
reflect the semantic characterisation of the logic. As a result, many new for-
malisms have been proposed over the last 30 years, including hypersequent cal-
culi, but also labelled calculi [37]. Hypersequents and labelled sequents are very
different in nature since, in the latter, the basic objects are usually formulas
of a more expressive language reflecting the logic’s semantics. Hypersequent
systems, in contrast, are generalisations of sequent systems, carrying a more
syntactic characteristic, and are sometimes considered an antagonist formalism
w.r.t. labelled calculi [5].
In the present work, we showed how hypersequents adequately reflect the
semantics of bi-neighbourhood models. In [7] the labelled sequent calculi LSE∗,
were developed for all the logics of the classical cube. These calculi also reflect
the bi-neighbourhood semantics, and are fully modular. In this section, we will
show that, in the case of NNML, hypersequents and labels are far from being
antagonists. In fact, we show that they are strongly related, by presenting
translations between H.E∗ (Figure 4) restricted to the classical cube and the
labelled calculi LSE∗, presented next.
The language LLS of labelled calculi extends L with a set WL = {x, y, z, ...}
of world labels, and a set NL = {a, b, c, ...} of neighbourhood labels. We define
positive neighbourhood terms, written a1 . . . an, as finite multisets of neighbour-
hood labels. Moreover, if t is a positive term, then t is a negative term. Negative
terms t cannot be proper subterms, in particular cannot be negated. The term τ
and its negative counterpart τ are neighbourhood constants. We will represent
by t either t or t.
Intuitively, positive (resp. negative) terms represent the intersection (resp. the
union) of their constituents. Moreover, t and t are the two members of a pair
of neighbourhoods in bi-neighbourhood models. Observe that the operation of
overlining a term cannot be iterated: it can be applied only once for turning a
positive term into a negative one. The operations of composition and substitu-
tion over positive terms are defined as usual (see [7]).
The formulas of LLS are of the following kinds and respective intuitive inter-
pretation
φ ::= x : A A is satisfied by x
| t ∀ A A is satisfied by every world in the neighbourhood t
| t ∃ A A is satisfied by some world in the neighbourhood t
| x ∈ t x is a world in the neighbourhood t
| t ⊲ x the pair (t, t) is a bi-neighbourhood of x.
Sequents are pairs Γ ⇒ ∆ of multisets of formulas of LLS. The fully modular
calculi LSE∗ are defined by the rules in Figure 7.
We are interested in the translation of derivations between H.E∗ and LSE∗.
We start by explaining some choices made thorough this work.
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Propositional rules
init
x : p,Γ⇒ ∆, x : p
L⊥
x : ⊥,Γ⇒ ∆
R⊤
Γ⇒ ∆, x : ⊤
Γ⇒ ∆, x : A x : B,Γ⇒ ∆
L→
x : A→ B,Γ⇒ ∆
x : A,Γ⇒ ∆, x : B
R→
Γ⇒ ∆, x : A→ B
x : A,x : B,Γ⇒ ∆
L∧
x : A ∧B,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, x : A Γ⇒ ∆, x : B
R∧
Γ⇒ ∆, x : A ∧B
x : A,Γ⇒ ∆ x : B,Γ⇒ ∆
L∨
x : A ∨ B,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, x : A,x : B
R∨
Γ⇒ ∆, x : A ∨ B
Rules for the classical cube
a ⊲ x, a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆, a ∃ A
L✷ (a!)
x : ✷A,Γ⇒ ∆
t ⊲ x,Γ⇒ ∆, x : ✷A, t ∀ A t ⊲ x, t ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆, x : ✷A
R✷
t ⊲ x,Γ⇒ ∆, x : ✷A
M
t ⊲ x, y ∈ t,Γ⇒ ∆
τ ⊲ x,Γ⇒ ∆
N (x in Γ ∪∆)
Γ⇒ ∆
ts ⊲ x, t ⊲ x, s ⊲ x,Γ⇒ ∆
C
t ⊲ x, s ⊲ x,Γ⇒ ∆
Rules for local forcing
x ∈ t, x : A, t ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆
L ∀
x ∈ t, t ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆
y ∈ t,Γ⇒ ∆, y : A
R ∀ (y!)
Γ⇒ ∆, t ∀ A
y ∈ t, y : A,Γ⇒ ∆
L ∃ (y!)
t ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆
x ∈ t,Γ⇒ ∆, x : A, t ∃ A
R ∃
x ∈ t,Γ⇒ ∆, t ∃ A
Rules for neighbourhood terms
x ∈ t, x ∈ s, x ∈ ts,Γ⇒ ∆
dec
x ∈ ts,Γ⇒ ∆
x ∈ t, x ∈ ts,Γ⇒ ∆ x ∈ s, x ∈ ts,Γ⇒ ∆
dec
x ∈ ts,Γ⇒ ∆
τ∅
x ∈ τ,Γ⇒ ∆
Application conditions:
y is fresh in R ∀and L ∃, a is fresh in L✷, and x occurs in the conclusion of N.
Figure 7: Rules of labelled sequent calculi LSE∗.
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Hypersequents. As already shown, hypersequents present an elegant and
modular solution for addressing non-normal modalities. This is mainly due to
two facts: (1) negative occurrences of ✷-ed formulas are organized into blocks;
and (2) components are independent once created. Hence proof search avoids
the non-determinism often generated by component communication rules [2],
establishing a straight-forward proof-search procedure. This is reflected in the
left and right rules for the ✷
G | Γ,✷A, 〈A〉 ⇒ ∆
L✷
G | Γ,✷A⇒ ∆
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Σ⇒ B {G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | B ⇒ A}A∈Σ
R✷
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
Reading rules from the conclusion upwards, the L✷ rule substitutes a ✷ with
a block. Blocks can then gather more formulas only by the applications of
the C rule. Applications of the rule R✷ closes this proof cycle, creating new
components involving only right-boxed and blocked formulas, and immediately
closing the communication between components.
This determines a proof search procedure, where propositional rules can be
eagerly applied until only blocks remain and a non-deterministic choice is trig-
gered, where blocs/boxed formulas should be combined for producing new com-
ponents. The invertibility of rules attenuates such non-determinism: allowing
the generation of all possible combinations avoids the need for backtracking.
But not only that: our calculi are greatly inspired and supported by the
choice of the semantics.
Bi-neighbourhood. As pointed out in the introduction, in the bi-neighbour-
hood semantics the elements of a pair provide positive and negative support
for a modal formula. This is fully captured by the box rules: the L✷ rule
places formulas into fresh neighbourhoods, the rule C joins such formulas into
intersections of neighbourhoods and the R✷ rule carries the formulas of a chosen
neighbourhood together with a right-boxed formula into a fresh world belonging
to this neighbourhood.
These ideas can be also interpreted using labels.
Labels. The labelled counterparts for the box rules are
a ⊲ x, a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆, a ∃ A
L✷
x : ✷A,Γ⇒ ∆
t ⊲ x,Γ⇒ ∆, x : ✷A, t ∀ A t ⊲ x, t ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆, x : ✷A
R✷
t ⊲ x,Γ⇒ ∆, x : ✷A
Starting from a labelled sequent S placed in a component labelled by a world-
variable x1, the L✷ rule over ✷A
1
ij creates a fresh neighbourhood-variable a
1
ij
of x1, placing A
1
ij in it. The rule C then joins formulas A
1
ij , j = 1, . . . , si1 into
blocks 〈Σ1i 〉, i = 1, . . . , l1, given by the intersection of the neighbourhoods a
1
ij ,
represented by a1i = a
1
i1 . . . a
1
isi1
. That is, the blocks 〈Σ1i 〉 formed from S carry
the information of boxed formulas, grouped into subsets {a1i }i, determined by
neighbourhood intersections.
The R✷ rule then non-deterministically choses one of such blocks a1i for
i ∈ {1, . . . l1} and a right-boxed formula B, creating a fresh world-variable x2 in
a1i and placing B and A
1
ij , for all j = 1, . . . , si1, under this world. Observe that
the left and right premises of rule R✷ reflect the positive and negative support
for the modal formula B.
This strongly highlights the similarities between the hyper and label for-
malisms. We define next a translation from hypersequents to labelled sequents.
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Definition 7.1. Let Σki = {A
k
ij}, i = 1, . . . , lk; j = 1, . . . , sik; k = 1, . . . n
and fix a hypersequent enumeration (see Definition 6.2). The translation [·]an
xn
from the hypersequent to the labelled languages, parametric on the world and
neighbourhood labels an and xn, respectively, is recursively defined as[
Γ, 〈Σ1i 〉 ⇒ ∆
]a1
x1
= {a1i ⊲ x1}i, {a
1
ij 
∀ A1ij}ij , x1 : Γ⇒ x1 : ∆, {a
1
ij 
∃ A1ij}ij
[G | Γ, 〈Σni 〉 ⇒ ∆]
an
xn
= [G]
an−1
xn−1
⊗ (xn ∈ bn, {ani ⊲ xn}i, {a
n
ij 
∀ Anij}ij , xn : Γ⇒
xn : ∆, {anij 
∃ Anij}ij)
where
• k = 1, . . . , n indexes the components;
• i = 1, . . . , lk indexes the blocks in the component k;
• j = 1, . . . , sik indexes the formulas in the block i of the component k;
• xn = {xk}1≤k≤n, where xk is a world variable relative to the k-th compo-
nent;
• an =
⋃n
k=1{a
k
i }1≤i≤lk , where {a
k
i }1≤i≤lk is the set of neighbourhood vari-
ables representing blocks in the k-th component, aki = a
k
i1 . . . a
k
isik
;
• bn ∈ {aki }i ∪ {a
k
i }i is a neighbourhood term, with 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1;
• the operator ⊗ represents the concatenation of sequents
(Θ1 ⇒ Υ1)⊗ (Θ2 ⇒ Υ2) := (Θ1,Θ2 ⇒ Υ1,Υ2)
For readability, we will ease the notation by assuming that: the active com-
ponent in the conclusion of rule applications has label n; 〈Σ〉 is a block in this
component with Σ = {Aj}, 1 ≤ j ≤ s; and a = a1 . . . as is the neighbourhood
variable representing 〈Σ〉, where a = τ if Σ = {⊤}; if b is the neighbourhood
variable representing 〈Π〉, then ab is the neighbourhood variable representing
〈Σ,Π〉. Finally, we will omit the non-active formulas on the derivations, replaced
by (possibly indexed) context variables X,Y .
Observe that hypersequent and labelled proofs have two important differ-
ences: rules inH.E∗ are kleene’d, in the sense that principal formulas are explic-
itly copied bottom-up; and LSE∗ introduces terms and proof-steps that have no
correspondence in the hypersequent setting. As a result, we need to introduce
some flexibility in how contexts are related between an hypersequent proof and
the labelled proof emulating it.
Let R be either a propositional or a left box rule in H.E∗, and H one of its
premises. We say that UH is an unkleene’d version of H if UH coincides with
H but for the replication of the principal formula, in an application of R (see
also Section 5). For example, in the derivation
H = G | Γ,✷A, 〈A〉 ⇒ ∆
G | Γ,✷A⇒ ∆
we have that UH = G | Γ, 〈A〉 ⇒ ∆.
Similarly, consider an application of the R✷ rule in H.E∗, with conclusion
H and premises H1, H
j
2 , 1 ≤ j ≤ s
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H1 = G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Σ⇒ B {H
j
2 = G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | B ⇒ Aj}Aj∈Σ
H = G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
R✷
and an application of the R✷ rule in LSE∗, with conclusion S = [H ]
an
xn
and
premises S1, S2
S1 = [H ]
an
xn
⊗ (⇒ a ∀ B) S2 = [H ]
an
xn
⊗ (a ∃ B ⇒ )
S = [H ]
an
xn
R✷
Let xn+1 be a fresh world variable. We call
EH1 = [H1]
an
xn+1
⊗ (xn+1 ∈ a, {xn+1 ∈ aj}j ⇒ ) and EHj
2
=
[
Hj2
]an
xn+1
⊗ (xn+1 ∈ a, xn+1 ∈ aj ⇒ )
extensions of [H1]
an
xn+1
and
[
Hj2
]an
xn+1
, respectively.2
The following lemma shows that unkleening and extensions do not alter
provability.
Lemma 7.1. Let H,UH , S1, S2, EH1 , EHj
2
as described above. Then
a. H and UH are height-preserving equivalent inH.E
∗, that is, H is provable
with height at most n in H.E∗ iff so it is UH ;
b. S1 (resp. S2) is provable iff EH1 is provable (resp. EHj
2
is provable, for all
1 ≤ j ≤ s) in LSE∗;
c. EH1 and [H1]
an
xn+1
(resp. E
H
j
2
and
[
Hj2
]an
xn+1
) are height-preserving equiv-
alent in LSE∗.
Proof. (a) is easily proven by the usual invertibility argument. Regarding (b),
observe that all the rules in LSE∗ are invertible. Hence, in the derivation π1:
EH1 = X, {aj 
∀ Aj}j, {xn+1 ∈ aj}j, xn+1 ∈ a, {xn+1 : Aj}j ⇒ xn+1 : B, Y
X, {aj ∀ Aj}j, {xn+1 ∈ aj}j , xn+1 ∈ a⇒ xn+1 : B, Y
L ∀
X, {aj ∀ Aj}j , xn+1 ∈ a⇒ xn+1 : B, Y
dec
S1 = X, {aj 
∀ Aj}j ⇒ a 
∀ B, Y
R ∀
the sequent S1 is provable iff EH1 is provable. Analogously for the derivation
π2:
{E
H
j
2
= X, xn+1 ∈ a, xn+1 ∈ aj , xn+1 : B ⇒ xn+1 : Aj , {aj ∃ Aj}j, Y }j
{X, xn+1 ∈ a, xn+1 ∈ aj , xn+1 : B ⇒ {aj ∃ Aj}j, Y }j
R ∃
X, xn+1 ∈ a, xn+1 : B ⇒ {aj ∃ Aj}j , Y
dec
S2 = X, a 
∃ B ⇒ {aj ∃ Aj}j , Y
L ∃
Finally, for (c), assume that there is a proof π of EH1 with height n. Observe
that the only rules that can be applied over xn+1 ∈ a and xn+1 ∈ aj in π are dec
and L ∀, respectively. But applying such rules would only duplicate formulas
already in EH1 , and thus could be eliminated. Hence π can be transformed
into a proof π′ of EH1 with height at most n, where no rules are applied over
xn+1 ∈ a or xn+1 ∈ aj, and the result follows. The case for EHj
2
is similar.
2Here we slightly abuse the notation since an+1 = an.
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The next result establishes the relationship between H.E∗ and LSE∗.
Theorem 7.2. Let H be an hypersequent inH.E∗ with length n. The following
are equivalent.
1. H is provable in H.E∗;
2. [H ]
an
xn
is provable in LSE∗.
Proof. Consider the following translation between hypersequent rule applica-
tions and derivations in the labelled calculi, where the translation for the propo-
sitional rules is the trivial one.
• Case L✷.
H = G | Γ,✷A, 〈A〉 ⇒ ∆
G | Γ,✷A⇒ ∆
❀
[UH = G | Γ, 〈A〉 ⇒ ∆]
an∪{a}
xn
[G | Γ,✷A⇒ ∆]an
xn
L✷
where a is a fresh neighbourhood variable to be added, in an, to the set
of neighbourhood variables representing blocks in the n-th component.
• Case R✷.
H1 = G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Σ⇒ B {H
j
2 = G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | B ⇒ Aj}j
H = G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
❀
EH1 = [H1]
an
xn+1
⊗ (xn+1 ∈ a, {xn+1 ∈ aj}j ⇒ )
... π1
S1 = [H ]
an
xn
⊗ (⇒ a ∀ B)
{E
H
j
2
=
[
Hj2
]an
xn+1
⊗ (xn+1 ∈ a, xn+1 ∈ aj ⇒ )}j
... π2
S2 = [H ]
an
xn
⊗ (a ∃ B ⇒ )
[H ]
an
xn
R✷
where π1, π2 are the derivations in the proof Lemma 7.1 (b).
• Case M. Similar and simpler to the case R✷, since the right premise in the
derivation above has the proof
X, a ⊲ x, xn+1 ∈ a, xn+1 : B ⇒ Y
M
X, a ⊲ x, a ∃ B ⇒ Y
L ∃
Hence,
H1 = G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Σ⇒ B
H = G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
❀
EH1 = [H1]
an
xn+1
⊗ (xn+1 ∈ a, {xn+1 ∈ aj}j ⇒ )
... π1
S1 = [H ]
an
xn
⊗ (⇒ a ∀ B)
[H ]
an
xn+1
R✷
• Case C.
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉, 〈Σ,Π〉 ⇒ ∆
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆
❀
[G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉, 〈Σ,Π〉 ⇒ ∆]an
xn
[G | Γ, 〈Σ〉, 〈Π〉 ⇒ ∆]an
xn
C
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• Case N.
G | Γ, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ∆
G | Γ⇒ ∆
❀
[G | Γ⇒ ∆]an
xn
⊗ (τ ⊲ xn ⇒ )
[G | Γ⇒ ∆]an
xn
N
Observe that [G | Γ, 〈⊤〉 ⇒ ∆]an
xn
= [G | Γ⇒ ∆]an
xn
⊗ (τ ⊲ xn, τ 
∀ ⊤ ⇒
τ ∃ ⊤). But this sequent is provable iff [G | Γ⇒ ∆]an
xn
⊗ (τ ⊲ xn ⇒ )
is provable, since τ ∀ ⊤ can only add x : ⊤ to the right context, while
τ ∃ ⊤ can only be triggered if x ∈ τ is already in the left context for
some x.
Given this transformation and in the view of Lemma 7.1, (1) ⇒ (2) is easily
proved by induction on a proof of H in H.E∗.
For proving (2) ⇒ (1) observe that provability is maintained from the end-
sequent to the open leaves in the translated derivations. This means that choos-
ing a formula [H ]an
xn
to work on is equivalent to performing all the steps of the
translation given above, ending with translated hypersequents of smaller proofs.
This is, in fact, one of the pillars of the focusing method [24].
In order to illustrate this, let H = G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ and consider the
following derivation in the monotonic case
π
[H ]
an
xn
⊗ (⇒ a ∀ B)
[H ]an
xn
R✷
where one decides to work on [H ]an
xn
. If a ∀ B is never principal in π, then π
acts over [H ]
an
xn
only and this derivation can be substituted by
π
[H ]
an
xn
⊗ (xn+1 ∈ a, {xn+1 ∈ aj}j , {xn+1 : Aj}j ⇒ xn+1 : B)
... π1
[H ]an
xn
⊗ (⇒ a ∀ B)
[H ]
an
xn
R✷
where π1 is the derivation presented in the proof of Lemma 7.1 (b). Observe
that [H ]
an
xn
⊗ (xn+1 ∈ a, {xn+1 ∈ aj}j , {xn+1 : Aj}j ⇒ xn+1 : B) is, in fact,
[H1]
an
xn+1
⊗ (xn+1 ∈ a, {xn+1 ∈ aj}j ⇒ ).
Suppose that a ∀ B is principal at some point in π. Since R ∀ is invertible,
it can be eagerly applied and π can be re-written as
π′
[H ]
an
xn
⊗ (xn+1 ∈ a⇒ xn+1 : B)
[H ]
an
xn
⊗ (⇒ a ∀ B)
R ∀
[H ]
an
xn+1
R✷
where the application of the rule R ∀ over a ∀ B is permuted down (and thus
it does not appear in π′). This same argument can be applied to dec and L ∀
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over xn+1 ∈ a and xn+1 ∈ aj , respectively, obtaining the proof
π′′
[H1]
an
xn+1
⊗ (xn+1 ∈ a, {xn+1 ∈ aj}j ⇒ )
... π1
[H ]an
xn
⊗ (⇒ a ∀ B)
[H ]
an
xn+1
R✷
According to Lemma 7.1 (c), [H1]
an
xn+1
⊗(xn+1 ∈ a, {xn+1 ∈ aj}j ⇒ ) is provable
iff [H1]
an
xn+1
is provable. By inductive hypothesis, H1 is provable in H.E
∗ with
proof δ. Hence H is provable with proof
δ
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆ | Σ⇒ B
G | Γ, 〈Σ〉 ⇒ ✷B,∆
R✷m
We finish this section by illustrating the translation in the monotonic case.
Example 7.1. Consider the following derivation of the axiom M in H.M
H = ✷(A ∧B), 〈A ∧B〉 ⇒ ✷A | A ∧B,A,B ⇒ A
init
✷(A ∧B), 〈A ∧B〉 ⇒ ✷A | A ∧B ⇒ A
L∧
✷(A ∧B), 〈A ∧B〉 ⇒ ✷A
R✷m
✷(A ∧B)⇒ ✷A
L✷
This is mimicked in LSE∗ by
S = a ⊲ x1, a 
∀ (A ∧B), x2 ∈ a, x2 : A, x2 : B ⇒ x1 : ✷A, a ∃ (A ∧B), x2 : A
init
a ⊲ x1, a 
∀ (A ∧B), x2 ∈ a, x2 : (A ∧B)⇒ x1 : ✷A, a ∃ (A ∧B), x2 : A
L∧
a ⊲ x1, a 
∀ (A ∧B), x2 ∈ a⇒ x1 : ✷A, a ∃ (A ∧B), x2 : A
L ∀
a ⊲ x1, a 
∀ (A ∧B)⇒ x1 : ✷A, a ∃ (A ∧B), a ∀ A
R ∀
π
a ⊲ x1, a 
∀ (A ∧B)⇒ x1 : ✷A, a ∃ (A ∧B)
R✷
x1 : ✷(A ∧B)⇒ x1 : ✷A
L✷
where π is
a ⊲ x1, x2 ∈ a, x2 : A⇒ x1 : ✷A, a ∃ (A ∧B)
M
a ⊲ x1, a 
∃ A⇒ x1 : ✷A, a ∃ (A ∧B)
L ∃
Observe that S = [UH ]
a
x1x2
⊗ (x2 ∈ a⇒ ).
8 Discussion and Conclusions
We have presented hypersequent calculi for the cube of classical non-normal
modal logics extended with axioms T , P , D, and rules RD+n . Apart from the
distinction between monotonic and non-monotonic systems, the calculi are mod-
ular. They also have a natural, and “almost internal” interpretation, as each
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component of a hypersequent can be read as a formula of the language. We
have shown that the hypersequent calculi have good structural properties, in
particular they enjoy cut elimination. The calculi provide a decision procedure,
which is of optimal (coNP) complexity for logics without C. Moreover, from a
failed proof we can easily extract a countermodel (of polynomial size for logics
without axiom C) in the bi-neighbourhood semantics, whence by an easy trans-
formation also in the standard one. Finally, the hypersequent calculi can be
embedded in the labelled calculi of [7] for the classical cube, providing thereby
a kind of “compact encoding” of derivations in the latter.
As we have already observed, not many works in the literature present proof
systems both allowing countermodel construction and enjoying optimal com-
plexity. In this respect, the nested sequent calculus for M proposed in [22]
achieves both goals it allows for both direct countermodel construction and
can be adapted for optimal complexity, similarly to what we did in Section 5.
However, as we explained, the nested-sequent structure is of no help for non-
monotonic logics. Additionally, since the logics there also contain normal modal
logic K, they are of PSPACE complexity.
Furthermore, optimal decision procedures for all logics of the classical cube
are presented in [14]. The procedures reduce validity/satisfiability in each modal
logic to a set of SAT problems, to be handled by a SAT solver; despite their
efficiency, the procedures provide neither “proofs”, nor countermodels, whence
having a different aim from the calculi of this work. Our hypersequent calculi
have nonetheless an interest for automated reasoning: for systems within the
classical cube, they have been implemented in the theorem prover HYPNO [8].
All in all, the structure of our calculi, namely hypersequents with blocks,
provides an adequate framework for extracting countermodels from a single
failed proof, ensuring, at the same time, good computational and structural
properties, as well as modularity. In particular, we believe that this structure
is likely the simplest and the most adequate having these features in the non-
monotonic case.
Two issues remain open: how to extend the present framework to deal with
the axioms 4, 5, B of normal modal logic, in particular in the non-monotonic
case. Since our calculi are based on the bi-neighbourhood semantics, this inves-
tigation presupposes an extension of the semantics itself to cover these axioms.
Another issue is the one of interpolation: [29] presents a general result on
uniform interpolation for rank-1 logics, which would cover all examples consid-
ered here. However, since there seem to be some issues with this result [33],
and since the construction of the interpolants is not fully explicit there, it is
worth continuing the exploration of proof theoretic ways of showing interpola-
tion results. In [27] a constructive proof of Craig interpolation is provided for
a good part of the logics considered in this work, but not for non-monotonic
logics with C. Could our calculi be used to cover these missing cases, perhaps
using methods like those of [20]? We intend to investigate this issue in future
work.
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